Stacy Hall v. Leroy Kirkegard ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STACY G. HALL, No. 18-35149
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 6:14-cv-00011-DLC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LEROY KIRKEGARD; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Dana L. Christensen, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 22, 2020**
Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Stacy Hall, a Montana state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in favor of prison officials in Hall’s civil rights action. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Ward v. Ryan,
623 F.3d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on
Hall’s Eighth Amendment claim that he was improperly restrained during medical
treatment. We do not discern any constitutional deficiency with the prison’s
requirement that locked housing inmates must be restrained for safety reasons
when in direct contact with staff, including in the infirmary. This policy includes
an exception when a physician, a physician’s assistant, or a nurse deems it
medically necessary. Neither this policy nor Hall’s treatment in the infirmary
violated the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, Hall failed to establish that any
supervisory defendant knew that Hall was being restrained while receiving
treatment. See, e.g., Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that, under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for actions of
subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability).
We reject Hall’s argument that the district court erred because it failed to
consider whether defendant Reich failed to intervene in Hall’s restraint. Hall did
not name Reich as a defendant in this cause of action.
The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on
Hall’s Eighth Amendment claims that prison officials (1) adopted policies that
placed him in danger, and (2) failed to protect him from an attack by placing him
in a block with rival gang members. Hall did not establish that any defendant
either knew of or deliberately disregarded an excessive risk to Hall’s safety. See,
2 18-35149
e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-38 (1994) (neither negligence nor
gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference); Labatad v. Corrections
Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013). Instead, the record reflects
that Hall had previously been housed for months in a locked unit with members of
a rival gang without incident, and he was being transferred by a correctional officer
to another locked unit where rival gang members were also housed when this
attack occurred. As the district court correctly observed, “[L]ike F block [where he
had been housed], CCMP [where he was going], was a locked housing unit where
Mr. Hall would have been locked down for the majority of the day and was
supposed to have had little if any interaction with other inmates on the block at
least for the first month while on that unit.”
The district court also rightly noted that the cases upon which Hall relies “all
deal with situations where an inmate was placed in general population or in the
same cell with rival gang members,” rendering his authorities materially
distinguishable.
We reject Hall’s argument that the district court failed to review de
novo the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations. The district judge did
state that it would review for clear error because Hall’s objections to the report
were insufficient to trigger de novo review. We need not address the correctness
of that ruling because the record reflects that the district court held that the
3 18-35149
magistrate’s rulings were correct, and we affirm those rulings of the district
court. Hall therefore received all the benefits of de novo review. We also reject as
unsupported by the record Hall’s contentions that (1) the district court failed to rule
on Hall’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations; and (2)
that the magistrate judge failed to rule on one of Hall’s state law claims.
The district court properly dismissed defendant Kohut for failure to state a
deliberate indifference medical claim. Hall’s disagreement with Kohut’s treatment
choices of medication do not state a colorable Eighth Amendment claim. See
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2004).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hall’s motions for
appointment of counsel, because Hall failed to demonstrate extraordinary
circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. See, e.g., Palmer v. Valdez,
560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hall’s discovery
motions, because Hall failed to demonstrate that the evidence sought was material.
See Hallet v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (district court did not
abuse discretion when denying motion to compel disclosure of defendants’ internal
policies after finding that material was minimally relevant).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating a prior sanctions
award. See Ingenco Holdings, LLC v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 921 F.3d 803, 808 (9th
4 18-35149
Cir. 2019) (stating standard of review). Assuming only for the sake of argument
that Hall has standing to appeal the order, the district court vacated the sanctions
because the factual record before the court had materially changed. See Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. 72 (district judge must modify or set aside any magistrate judge order
that is “clearly erroneous”).
AFFIRMED.
5 18-35149