Josefa Lopez v. Executive Trustee Service ( 2014 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                               JUN 12 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    JOSEFA S. LOPEZ; JOSE TRINIDAD                   No. 11-17645
    CASAS; MARIA C. CASAS; LYNDON
    B. GRAVES; TYRONE EVENSON;                       D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00180-ECR-
    MICHELLINA EVENSON; BRYAN                        VPC
    GRAY; HELEN GRAY; PATRICK
    FRANKOSKI; CHRISTOPHER
    PETERNELL,                                       MEMORANDUM*
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE
    AGENCY, as Conservator of Fannie Mae
    and Freddie Mac,
    Intervenor-Defendant -
    Appellee,
    EXECUTIVE TRUSTEE SERVICE, LLC;
    COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.;
    GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC; NATIONAL
    CITY MORTGAGE; NATIONAL CITY
    CORPORATION; PNC FINANCIAL
    SERVICES, INC.; AIG UNITED
    GUARANTY CORPORATION; WELLS
    FARGO BANK, NA; BANK OF
    AMERICA, NA; RECONSTRUCT;
    *
    36                This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    37   except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    SAXON MORTGAGE SERVICES INC.;
    GALE GROUP; SECURITY UNION
    TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY;
    NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING
    CORPORATION; NATIONAL CITY
    BANK; WELLS FARGO HOME
    EQUITY; WELLS FARGO HOME
    MORTGAGE, INC.; CHEVY CHASE
    BANK FSB; HOMECOMINGS
    FINANCIAL, LLC,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Edward C. Reed, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 8, 2013**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: TASHIMA, W. FLETCHER, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiffs, homeowners whose home loans have fallen into default, appeal
    the district court’s order dismissing their Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)
    under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6). We affirm.
    Plaintiffs challenge the order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
    (“JPML”) transferring this case to the U.S. District Court for the District of
    Arizona (“MDL Court”) and the MDL Court’s order interpreting the JPML’s order.
    **
    26                The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    27   without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2
    We lack jurisdiction to review the JPML’s order because Plaintiffs have not sought
    a writ of mandamus. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1407
    (e); see In re Wilson, 
    451 F.3d 161
    , 168 (3d
    Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs waived their challenge to the MDL Court’s order by not
    “specifically and distinctly” arguing it in their opening brief. Kim v. Kang, 
    154 F.3d 996
    , 1000 (9th Cir. 1998).
    The district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ fraud in the inducement
    claims for failure to plead fraud with particularity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In
    order to successfully plead claims grounded in fraud, a complaint must “state the
    time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities
    of the parties to the misrepresentation.” Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 
    356 F.3d 1058
    , 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Alan Neuman Prods, Inc. v. Albright, 
    862 F.2d 1388
    , 1392–93 (9th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiffs’ SAC fails to provide the necessary
    allegations of “the who, what, where, when, and how” of the fraud. See Vess v.
    Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 
    317 F.3d 1097
    , 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cooper v.
    Pickett, 
    137 F.3d 616
    , 627 (9th Cir. 1998)).
    The district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment.
    Under Nevada law, unjust enrichment is not available when the parties had an
    express, written contract. LeasePartners Corp. v. Robert L. Brooks Trust Dated
    Nov. 12, 1975, 
    942 P.2d 182
    , 187 (Nev. 1997). Even if unjust enrichment is
    3
    available when an express contract is procured by fraud, Plaintiffs did not plead
    fraud with particularity.
    Because Plaintiffs’ claims for fraud in the inducement and unjust enrichment
    both fail, the district court also properly dismissed their requests for injunctive and
    declaratory relief.
    Although leave to amend should be granted with “extreme liberality,”
    Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 
    292 F.3d 992
    , 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Morongo
    Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 
    893 F.2d 1074
    , 1079 (9th Cir. 1990)), “[t]he
    district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where
    plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Ascon Props, Inc. v. Mobil Oil
    Co., 
    866 F.2d 1149
    , 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs already amended their
    complaint once as of right and once with the leave of the district court. Contrary to
    the assertions in their opening brief, Plaintiffs made no motion for leave to amend
    their SAC. The district court did not abuse its discretion, either in failing to make
    Plaintiffs an unsolicited offer to amend their SAC or in dismissing the complaint
    with prejudice.
    AFFIRMED.
    4