United States v. Liwen Tang ( 2014 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUN 16 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-10668
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 1:11-cr-00027-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LIWEN TANG,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands
Ramona V. Manglona, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 11, 2014**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: W. FLETCHER, IKUTA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Liwen Tang appeals her jury convictions of two counts of immigration
document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). We have jurisdiction over Tang’s
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 48 U.S.C. § 1824, and affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1. Tang contends that Part 3B of the I-485 Form, which asked Tang to list her
“present husband/wife, all of your sons and daughters,” is fundamentally ambiguous.1
“A question is fundamentally ambiguous when ‘men of ordinary intelligence’ cannot
arrive at a mutual understanding of its meaning.” United States v. Culliton, 328 F.3d
1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526, 1534 (9th
Cir. 1991)). That is not the case here. The form plainly asked Tang to list “all” of her
children; her response identifying only one of her two children was a false statement.
2. Tang also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying her
conviction for making false statements on her I-485 Form and to an immigration
adjudicator. We review to determine whether, taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1167
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
The evidence was sufficient to support Tang’s convictions. Both the I-485
Form and the immigration adjudicator asked Tang to disclose all of her children. See
United States v. Chu, 5 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1993). Tang’s false responses to
those inquiries were capable of influencing a decision to grant Tang permanent
1
Tang’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) is unconstitutionally vague was not
raised in her opening brief, and is therefore waived. McKay v. Ingleson, 558 F.3d 888,
891 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2009).
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resident status because the immigration adjudicator testified that the information could
have cast doubt on the legitimacy of Tang’s marriage to Patrick Mansfield. They were
thus material. See United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008).
There also was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Tang understood the
questions being asked and understood that the answers she gave were false. For
instance, Tang told the investigators that she did not disclose her previous child
because she was ashamed to have had a child out of wedlock. See United States v.
Sainz, 772 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1985).
AFFIRMED.
3