Billy Phiffer v. State of Oregon , 586 F. App'x 425 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                DEC 05 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BILLY RAY PHIFFER, an individual,                No. 12-35550
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:10-CV-01120-SU
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    STATE OF OREGON, as being
    represented by Baker County Circuit Court
    and the Office of District Attorney for
    Baker County, a public entity; BAKER
    COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
    OFFICE; BAKER COUNTY CIRCUIT
    COURT,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 6, 2014**
    Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and D.W. NELSON and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Billy Ray Phiffer appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of the State
    of Oregon. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    The district court did not err in dismissing Phiffer’s claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . “The Eleventh Amendment has been authoritatively construed to deprive
    federal courts of jurisdiction over suits by private parties against unconsenting
    States.” Seven Up Pete Venture v. Schweitzer, 
    523 F.3d 948
    , 952 (9th Cir. 2008)
    (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 
    517 U.S. 44
    , 54 (1996)). The Supreme Court
    has held that Congress did not abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
    in enacting § 1983. Kentucky v. Graham, 
    473 U.S. 159
    , 169 n.17 (1985) (citing
    Quern v. Jordan, 
    440 U.S. 332
     (1979)). Moreover, the State of Oregon has not
    expressly waived its immunity.
    The district court did not err in dismissing Phiffer’s claims under the
    American with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court
    properly found the underlying actors allegedly involved in scheduling the hearing
    forming the basis of Phiffer’s claims—the state court judge, court clerk, and
    district attorney—were protected by judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial
    immunities respectively. See In re Castillo, 
    297 F.3d 940
    , 951 (9th Cir. 2002)
    (holding that “the scheduling of hearings” by a non-judicial officer was an action
    entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 
    260 F.3d
                2
    1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Ruling on a motion is a normal judicial
    function . . . .”). As the State of Oregon can only be liable here for the actions of
    the Baker County Circuit Court and the Baker County District Attorney based on
    the doctrine of respondeat superior, these immunities also protect the State as all of
    the underlying actors are immune from liability. See Restatement (Third) of Torts:
    Apportionment Liab. § 13 cmt. b (2000) (“The vicariously liable party is liable
    only for the share of plaintiff’s damages for which the tortious actor is held
    liable.”)
    AFFIRMED.
    3