Antonio Gomez-Beltran v. William Barr ( 2020 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 5 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ANTONIO GOMEZ-BELTRAN,                           No.   16-72518
    17-70740
    Petitioner,
    Agency No. A099-485-184
    v.
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,               MEMORANDUM*
    and ORDER
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted February 3, 2020**
    Phoenix, Arizona
    Before: GRABER, HURWITZ, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
    Antonio Gomez-Beltran, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
    of two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”): one denying a
    motion to reopen, and the other denying a motion to remand and dismissing an
    appeal from the order of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying cancellation of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We dismiss the petitions in
    part and otherwise deny them.1
    1.     The proceedings before the IJ were not legally defective merely
    because the interpreter was not formally sworn in. The interpreter was properly
    sworn in during an earlier hearing.       See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.5.       Any purported
    deficiencies in the translation did not “prejudice[] the outcome of [the] hearing.”
    Hartooni v. INS, 
    21 F.3d 336
    , 340 (9th Cir. 1994). Gomez does not identify any
    mistranslation relevant to his criminal history, the issue that formed the basis for the
    denial of relief.
    2.     The IJ did not err in failing to employ additional procedural safeguards
    because of Gomez’s mental state.          Gomez did not show indicia of mental
    incompetency and was afforded ample opportunity to consult with his attorney and
    to present evidence. See Salgado v. Sessions, 
    889 F.3d 982
    , 987–89 (9th Cir. 2018).
    Nor did the BIA engage in improper fact-finding in rejecting this argument. Because
    Gomez raised the competency issue for the first time before the BIA, the BIA was
    required to assess the existing record to determine whether further proceedings were
    necessary. See Mejia v. Sessions, 
    868 F.3d 1118
    , 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2017).
    3.     We lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of cancellation
    1
    We grant the government’s motion to take judicial notice of a subsequent
    decision of the BIA denying Gomez’s motion for reconsideration. See Dent v.
    Holder, 
    627 F.3d 365
    , 371 (9th Cir. 2010) (taking judicial notice of agency records).
    2
    of removal. Bazua-Cota v. Gonzales, 
    466 F.3d 747
    , 749 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
    We therefore do not address the agency’s alternative finding that Gomez could not
    establish the good moral character required for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
    §§ 1101(f)(6), 1229b(b)(1)(B).
    4.     The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gomez’s motion to
    remand for ineffective assistance of counsel. See Kwong v. Holder, 
    671 F.3d 872
    ,
    880 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating standard of review). Gomez did not provide his former
    attorney with an “adequate opportunity to respond” to the allegations of
    ineffectiveness. See Reyes v. Ashcroft, 
    358 F.3d 592
    , 598–99 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
    Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988)). Although “we have not
    hesitated to address ineffective assistance of counsel claims even when an alien fails
    to comply strictly with Lozada,” Ray v. Gonzales, 
    439 F.3d 582
    , 588 (9th Cir. 2006),
    this is not a case in which “the record shows a clear and obvious case of ineffective
    assistance,” Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 
    282 F.3d 1218
    , 1227 (9th Cir. 2002).
    5.     The BIA did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen proceedings
    to allow Gomez to apply for adjustment of status, asylum, withholding of removal,
    and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The BIA assumed
    Gomez’s eligibility for adjustment of status but reasonably concluded that his
    significant misrepresentations before the IJ disentitled him to this discretionary
    relief. See Singh v. Holder, 
    643 F.3d 1178
    , 1181 (9th Cir. 2011). The BIA also
    3
    reasonably concluded that the evidence in support of the applications for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and CAT protection could have been presented at his prior
    proceedings before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
    6.     Because Gomez has not shown legal or constitutional error, we lack
    jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to
    remand proceedings. See Menendez v. Whitaker, 
    908 F.3d 467
    , 471 (9th Cir. 2018).
    7.     Gomez’s motion to remand to terminate proceedings for lack of
    jurisdiction is denied. A notice to appear need not include the date and time of the
    hearing to vest jurisdiction. See Karingithi v. Whitaker, 
    913 F.3d 1158
    , 1160–62
    (9th Cir. 2019).
    PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
    4