Shahrokh Mireskandari v. Barrington Mayne ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    APR 6 2020
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SHAHROKH MIRESKANDARI; PAUL                     No.    16-55547
    BAXENDALE-WALKER,                                      17-55540
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,          D.C. No. 2:12-cv-03861-JGB-
    MRW
    v.
    BARRINGTON MAYNE; et al.,                       MEMORANDUM*
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted February 4, 2020
    San Francisco, California
    Before:      PAEZ and BEA, Circuit Judges, and JACK,** District Judge.
    Shahrokh Mireskandari and Paul Baxendale-Walker appeal the district
    court’s judgment dismissing their action with prejudice. They also appeal the
    denial of their motion for an indicative ruling, made under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 62.1, that the district court would likely grant relief from the judgment
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Janis Graham Jack, United States District Judge for
    under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) or (b)(3). We have jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the dismissal of the appellants’ complaint de
    novo. DB Healthcare, LLC v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ariz., Inc., 
    852 F.3d 868
    ,
    873, n.5 (9th Cir. 2017). We review the district court’s denial of the Rule 62.1
    motion, which served as a denial of the Rule 60(b) motion on the merits, for an
    abuse of discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(2); United States v. Asarco, Inc.,
    
    430 F.3d 972
    , 978 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed appellants’ claims against Barrington
    Mayne, Malcolm Lees, David Middleton, Antony Townsend, and Richard Hegarty
    because these defendants were entitled to common-law foreign sovereign
    immunity. The allegations as to these defendants consistently stated that they
    acted to further the objectives of foreign government entities, the Law Society of
    England and Wales (“LSE”) and the Solicitors Regulation Authority (“SRA”).
    Because the defendants performed the alleged conduct in their official capacities,
    they are entitled to common-law foreign sovereign immunity. See Dogan v. Barak,
    
    932 F.3d 888
    , 893-94 (9th Cir. 2019) (common-law foreign immunity shields
    foreign officials from liability for “acts performed in their official capacity if the
    effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against the state.”
    (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). The record does not
    the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    2                                     16-55547
    support the appellants’ contention that these defendants waived common-law
    foreign sovereign immunity as a defense by failing to raise it in their motion to
    dismiss.
    The district court properly dismissed the defamation claim against Mansur
    Rahnema as barred by the litigation privilege. See Wang v. Heck, 
    137 Cal. Rptr. 3d
    332, 337 (Ct. App. 2012) (discussing requirements for application of
    California’s litigation privilege). Rahnema’s email to Dr. Farzam was covered by
    the privilege because Rahnema was a witness in the LSE/SRA disciplinary
    proceedings, and the email sought to convince Dr. Farzam to stop assisting
    Mireskandari so that the proceedings could go forward. Rhanema’s phone call to
    Mireskandari’s attorney, Michael Hayes, was made after this litigation began and
    was thus covered by the privilege.
    The district court properly dismissed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
    Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim against Rahnema because appellants failed to
    allege facts sufficient to show a predicate act. See United Bhd. of Carpenters &
    Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. & Const. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 
    770 F.3d 834
    , 837 (9th
    Cir. 2014) (stating the elements of a civil RICO claim). To the extent appellants
    argue that Rahnema engaged in the predicate acts of witness tampering and
    extortion, they forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the district court.
    See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    3                                      16-55547
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ motion
    to compel discovery relating to sovereign immunity because appellants failed to
    demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice resulting from the denial of the
    requested discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 
    296 F.3d 732
    , 751 (9th Cir. 2002)
    (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court’s “decision to
    deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that denial
    of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.”
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)) The appellants’ operative
    complaint alleges that defendants Mayne, Lees, Middleton, Townsend, and
    Hegarty were working within their official capacities to advance the goals of the
    LSE/SRA, and additional discovery would not have affected their eligibility for
    common-law sovereign immunity.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion
    for an indicative ruling regarding relief from the judgment because appellants
    failed to establish any basis for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc.,
    
    5 F.3d 1255
    , 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds
    for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). The district court’s finding
    that appellants’ “newly discovered” evidence either could have been discovered
    previously with reasonable diligence, or was cumulative of evidence already
    considered, was not “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that
    4                                     16-55547
    may be drawn from the record.” United States v. Hinkson, 
    585 F.3d 1247
    , 1262
    (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). The same is true of the district court’s finding that
    appellants lacked clear and convincing evidence that the judgment was obtained by
    fraud.
    Appellants’ request for “expeditious treatment and/or a limited remand for
    discovery based on the ages of parities and witnesses” (Docket Entry No. 98 in
    Appeal No. 16-55547; Docket Entry No. 55 in Appeal No. 17-55540) is denied as
    moot.
    AFFIRMED.
    5                                       16-55547