eLaws | Code of Federal Regulations | United States Code |
 All Courts
 Federal Courts
 US Court of Appeals Cases
 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
 2020-02

United States v. Jerrod Schmidt ( 2020 )


Menu:
 
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 10 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.   18-10489
Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
3:18-cr-08131-SPL-1
v.
JERROD HUNTER SCHMIDT,                          MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 6, 2020**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: O'SCANNLAIN, GRABER, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Jerrod Hunter Schmidt was convicted of transmitting threats against the
President, in violation of
    18 U.S.C. § 871
    (a), and transmitting threatening
communications through interstate commerce, in violation of
    18 U.S.C. § 875
    (c).
We have jurisdiction under
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a
diminished-capacity instruction.    Such an instruction is not required in cases
involving threatening communications if the evidence shows only “the inherent
irrationality of the threats themselves.” United States v. Christian,
    749 F.3d 806
    ,
815 (9th Cir. 2014). Schmidt’s threats were arguably irrational, but no more so than
those in Christian. See
    id.
     at 808–10. The district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the instruction because all “a jury could reasonably infer from this
evidence [is] that [Schmidt] suffered from some form of mental illness.”1
    Id. at 815
    .
2.   Schmidt contends that the district court plainly erred by allowing
government witnesses to opine on the seriousness of the threats. But the district
court did not describe the witnesses as experts, and the government never “prompted
the jurors to defer to the expert opinions of its witnesses.” United States v. Hanna,
    293 F.3d 1080
    , 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). Rather, the government elicited this testimony
“merely to explain why the federal agents began investigating” Schmidt. United
States v. Wahchumwah,
    710 F.3d 862
    , 871 (9th Cir. 2013). “It is not improper for
the government to elicit background information from a witness.” United States v.
1
Because we find insufficient evidence to support Schmidt’s proposed
instruction, we need not decide whether Elonis v. United States,
    575 U.S. 723
    (2015), affects the continuing validity of our cases holding that diminished capacity
is not a defense to § 871(a) charges because it is a general-intent crime. See, e.g.,
United States v. Twine,
    853 F.2d 676
    , 679–81 (9th Cir. 1988); Roy v. United States,
    416 F.2d 874
    , 877–78 (9th Cir. 1969).
2
Croft,
    124 F.3d 1109
    , 1120 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, the challenged testimony did
not deny Schmidt’s right “to a fair trial.” United States v. Houser,
    804 F.2d 565
    ,
570 (9th Cir. 1986).
AFFIRMED.
3