Susan Burnaroos v. Carolyn Colvin ( 2015 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 21 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
SUSAN BURNAROOS, No. 13-35952
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-03073-JTR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
John Tyler Rodgers, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 10, 2015**
Seattle, Washington
Before: NGUYEN and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges and ZOUHARY,*** District
Judge.
Susan Burnaroos appeals the district court’s affirmance of the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Jack Zouhary, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
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Commissioner’s denial of Social Security and Supplemental Security Income
disability benefits. We review the district court’s order de novo and the
Commissioner’s denial of benefits for substantial evidence. Molina v. Astrue, 674
F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
1. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) gave germane reasons for
disregarding the Mental Medical Source Statement of Nina Rapisarda, M.S.W. See
Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010). Substantial
evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusions that Burnaroos’s condition improved
during 2009 and 2010, and that her complaints about agoraphobia and paranoia
symptoms resolved over time and were inconsistent with her activities of daily
living.
2. The ALJ did not fail to consider evidence from Shahm Martini, M.D., Jay
Toews, Ed.D., Billy Nordyke, D.O., and Sandra Birdlebough, A.R.N.P. The ALJ
specifically considered and cited the documents containing their opinions, and
discussed Nordyke and Birdlebough’s documents at length.
3. The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for disbelieving
Burnaroos’s statements regarding the intensity of her symptoms. See Molina, 674
F.3d at 1112. Burnaroos’s symptoms improved with treatment, and her daily living
activities were inconsistent with her statements about symptom intensity. See id. at
1112-13. Because the ALJ’s reasons were supported by the record, any other error
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by the ALJ with respect to Burnaroos’s credibility was harmless. See Carmickle v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008).
4. Although the ALJ incorrectly concluded that there was no record support
for a diagnosis of ADHD, this error was harmless because substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Burnaroos’s ADHD was not a severe
impairment. Specifically, Dr. Klein testified that the medical record was not
consistent with a diagnosis of ADHD, and the ALJ could reasonably conclude that
Burnaroos’s decision to not take ADHD medications for a period of time suggests
her symptoms were not severe. Cf. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th
Cir. 2008) (concluding that a claimant’s decision to stop taking medicine undercut
his testimony that his condition was debilitating).
5. The ALJ did not err in concluding that Burnaroos can do work she did in
the past as a housekeeper and fast food worker. Burnaroos’s time as a housekeeper
was past relevant work because it occurred during the last 15 years, was substantial
gainful activity, and lasted long enough for her to learn to do it. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1560(b)(1). There was also no error in the hypothetical that the ALJ posed to
the vocational expert, which adequately addressed Burnaroos’s difficulties
interacting with the general public and responding to supervisors. See Bayliss v.
Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that an ALJ’s hypothetical
must contain the limitations that an ALJ finds credible and supported by substantial
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evidence).
AFFIRMED.
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