Santiago Cedillo-Ramirez v. Jeffrey Rosen ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 8 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANTIAGO GABRIEL CEDILLO- No. 18-71614
RAMIREZ, AKA Alex Henry Solis,
Agency No. A208-598-018
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
JEFFREY A. ROSEN, Acting Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 9, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: KELLY,*** GOULD, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Santiago Gabriel Cedillo-Ramirez (“Cedillo”), a native and citizen of Mexico,
entered the United States without admission in 1990. He later assumed a false
identity by purchasing another person’s birth certificate. He used this false identity
in ways including to obtain a replacement social security card, to file taxes, and to
provide information on his son’s birth certificate.
After applying for a passport under the false name, he was confronted about
the false identity and admitted his true identity. In 2015, DHS issued a Notice to
Appear and charged him as removeable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an
alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. Cedillo applied
for cancellation of removal.
After a hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”), the IJ denied Cedillo’s
request for cancellation of removal. Cedillo appealed that decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed the appeal. This appeal
followed.
When the BIA issues its own opinion, we review the BIA’s decision as the
final agency determination. See Corpuz v. Holder, 697 F.3d 807, 810 (9th Cir.
2012). We review legal questions de novo. See Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d
1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014).
We do not have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of cancellation based
on the discretionary determination that he lacks good moral character under the
2
“catch-all” provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).” Lopez-Castellanos v. Gonzales, 437
F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We are bound by that discretionary determination,
which is insulated from federal review[.]”). We do retain jurisdiction to review
“colorable legal or constitutional questions regarding the discretionary cancellation
determination.” Alvarado v. Lynch, 623 F. App’x 432 (9th Cir. 2015).
The good moral character catchall provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), as applied to
Cedillo is not void for vagueness. Cedillo’s argument that as applied to him, the
good moral character catchall provision under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) is void for
vagueness, is erroneous. The Government properly explains that cancellation of
removal is a type of discretionary relief that does not create a substantive interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. Denial of cancellation of removal does not
deprive Cedillo of a constitutionally protected interest.
“[A]liens have ‘no fundamental right to discretionary relief from removal for
purposes of due process and equal protection’ because such relief is a ‘privilege
created by Congress.’” Mendez-Garcia v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 655, 665 (9th Cir. 2016)).
A denial of discretionary relief “cannot violate a substantive interest protected by
the Due Process clause.” Munoz v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2003)).
“Because ‘cancellation of removal is a form of discretionary relief which does not
give rise to a ‘substantive interest protected by the Due Process Clause’, its denial
3
likewise does not deprive an applicant of a constitutionally protected liberty or
property interest.” Mendez-Garcia, 840 F.3d at 665.
Finally, under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the agency did not
lack jurisdiction. Cedillo contends that the Notice to Appear was deficient, and that
the IJ did not have jurisdiction over his case because the Notice to Appear lacked a
specific date and time. We reject this argument. Pereira deals with only the narrow
issue of whether an NTA that does not specify the time and place of the proceedings
triggers the stop-time rule. Pereira, 138 S.Ct. at 2113. But as noted by the
Government, this case does not implicate the stop-time rule.
PETITION DENIED.
4