Amanpreet Singh v. Jeffrey Rosen ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 8 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMANPREET SINGH, No. 18-72835
Petitioner, Agency No. A209-156-986
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFREY A. ROSEN, Acting Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted October 5, 2020
Portland, Oregon
Before: PAEZ and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON,** District
Judge.
Dissent by Judge RAWLINSON
Amanpreet Singh petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. The only issue
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for
the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
we must consider is whether the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is supported
by substantial evidence. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we
review findings of fact for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. See
Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 2013). “Where, as here, the BIA
agrees with the IJ decision and also adds its own reasoning, we review the decision
of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision upon which it relies.” Duran-
Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2019). We grant the petition
and remand for further proceedings.
The IJ found Singh not credible for three reasons, all of which were affirmed
by the BIA. None of them, however, are supported by substantial evidence. See
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that an IJ
must consider the totality of the circumstances and “provide ‘specific and cogent
reasons’ in support of an adverse credibility determination.”).
First, the IJ found a discrepancy between Singh’s testimony, during which
he described having been beaten by police, and a summary of his prior credible
fear interview, which mentioned imprisonment and threats from police, but not a
beating. The omissions from Singh’s credible fear interview were likely the result
of imprecise questioning by the asylum officer. Singh’s interview answers were
responsive to the questions that the interviewer asked; he testified that he had been
beaten by the opposition parties, stated at his credible fear interview that the police
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were members of those parties, and was only asked at his credible fear interview
whether he had been harmed by police “[a]side from the Badal and BJP party
members.” Furthermore, as we have recognized, “[i]t is well established that the
mere omission of details is insufficient to uphold an adverse credibility finding.”
Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Second, the IJ found it suspicious that Singh obtained a passport several
months before he was ever beaten. Singh, however, made no representation that he
intended to leave the country prior to being beaten. An adverse credibility
determination cannot be based upon speculation or conjecture. Chawla v. Holder,
599 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
Third, the IJ viewed a letter from a treating physician as evidence of a
premeditated asylum scheme because (1) Singh’s father obtained the letter three
weeks after Singh was treated and (2) the letter listed only certain classes of
medicine, rather than specific names of medicines. When asked why his father
would have obtained the letter before Singh ever left India, Singh responded that
his father may have obtained the letter because he wished to keep records of
Singh’s medical treatment, about which there is nothing inherently suspect. Singh
having offered a “reasonable and plausible explanation” for why his father
obtained the medical records, the IJ’s speculation does not provide substantial
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evidence to support this ground for finding Singh not credible. See Rizk v. Holder,
629 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011). Nor did the IJ provide any cogent
explanation why the doctor’s lack of detail as to the specific medicines prescribed
undermines Singh’s credibility.
Because substantial evidence does not support the agency’s adverse
credibility determination, we grant the petition for review and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this disposition.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED AND REMANDED.
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FILED
JAN 8 2021
Singh v. Barr, Case No. 18-72835
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, dissenting: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the adverse
credibility determination made by the agency was not supported by substantial
evidence. The majority’s conclusion does not comport with the governing
standard of review.
We review an adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence.
See Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020). Under this stringent
standard, an adverse credibility determination can be overturned only if “any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id.(citation omitted). We have repeatedly recognized that “only the most
extraordinary circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility
determination.” Id. (quoting Jin v. Holder, 748 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2014) and
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010)). In addition, even one
discrepancy suffices as a basis for an adverse credibility determination. See Rizk v.
Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[w]e must uphold
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination so long as one of the identified grounds is
supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of the alien’s claim of
persecution”) (citation, alterations, footnote reference, and internal quotation marks
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omitted).
This case does not present an extraordinary circumstance warranting reversal
of the adverse credibility determination. The agency relied on the following
matters to support the adverse credibility determination:
1. Petitioner Amanpreet Singh’s failure to mention during his credible
fear interview that he and his father were beaten by the police even though he was
“specifically asked if he had ever suffered any mistreatment or feared suffering any
mistreatment at the hands of authorities in India, including the police.” Singh
confirmed the summary that was provided at the end of the credible fear interview,
with no mention of beatings by the police. We have consistently upheld adverse
credibility determinations under this circumstance—when an individual seeking
asylum makes no mention of harm that he later offers as evidence of persecution.
See e.g., Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing that “[t]he
IJ could reasonably conclude that there is a valid discrepancy between the airport
interview and [Petitioner’s later] testimony”). No reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to reach a contrary conclusion regarding Singh’s testimony in this case.
2. The implausibility of Singh obtaining a passport one year prior to the
assaults he relied on to support his persecution claim, when he initially testified
that he obtained the passport in 2016 to leave India. It would be reasonable for the
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Immigration Judge (IJ) to infer that Singh recognized the implausibility of his
obtaining a passport before the asserted assaults, hence the initial statement
regarding the date of the passport. See Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1135
(9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that adverse credibility findings may be supported on
the basis of implausibility).
3. The implausible explanation provided by Singh for obtaining his
medical record prior to leaving India. Initially, Singh testified that his father
obtained a “hospital letter” and sent it to him in the United States. However, when
the IJ pointed out that the letter was dated prior to Singh’s departure from India,
when he assertedly had no plans to leave the country, Singh changed his story to
state that he needed the letter for his records “if in the future [he] need[ed] the
medicine again.” However, the problem with that explanation was that the letter
did not mention any medicines Singh received. Rather, the letter only referenced
generally “antibiotics, analgesics, [and] PPIs.” The IJ was not required to accept
Singh’s inconsistent testimony and implausible explanation. See Zamanov v.
Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2011). If we were reviewing de novo, perhaps
we would reach a different conclusion. However, reviewing for substantial
evidence, we cannot say on this record that a contrary conclusion is compelled.
I would deny the petition for review.
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