Ditech Financial LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 8829 ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 20 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DITECH FINANCIAL LLC; FEDERAL                   No.    18-16199
    NATIONAL MORTGAGE
    ASSOCIATION,                                    D.C. No.
    2:17-cv-02164-JCM-GWF
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    SATICOY BAY LLC SERIES 8829
    CORNWALL GLEN,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    AMERICAN WEST VILLAGE II
    OWNERS ASSOCIATION; NEVADA
    ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 7, 2020**
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: BOGGS,*** IKUTA, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    Saticoy Bay appeals from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in
    favor of Ditech Financial LLC and the Federal National Mortgage Association
    (Fannie Mae). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
    1.     This court has already found that 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3), also known
    as the Federal Foreclosure Bar, preempts Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2).
    Berezovsky v. Moniz, 
    869 F.3d 923
    , 931 (9th Cir. 2017). Moreover, “the Federal
    Foreclosure Bar applies to any property for which the [Federal Housing Finance
    Agency (FHFA)] serves as conservator,” so the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies to
    all of Fannie Mae’s property, 
    id. at 928,
    because FHFA serves as Fannie Mae’s
    conservator, see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4617(i)(2)(A)(i).
    2.     Fannie Mae has presented admissible evidence, specifically business
    records and an employee declaration authenticating those records, that it had a
    valid interest in the property at issue. We have found that this is enough to
    establish ownership over the property interest. See 
    id. at 932–33
    & n.8; see also
    U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 
    576 F.3d 1040
    , 1044 (9th Cir.
    2009) (“It is not necessary for each individual who entered a record of payment
    ***
    The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2
    into the database to testify as to the accuracy of each piece of data entered.”).
    Saticoy Bay’s arguments that Fannie Mae did not have a valid property interest due
    to Nevada’s statute of frauds and because Fannie Mae did not appear as the deed of
    trust’s record beneficiary are unavailing. Easton Bus. Opportunities v. Town Exec.
    Suites, 
    230 P.3d 827
    , 832 n.4 (Nev. 2010) (noting “the general law that, while
    statute of frauds provisions may ‘prevent enforcement against an assignor unless
    there is a memorandum in writing or some substitute formality, . . . they cannot
    ordinarily be asserted by third persons, including the obligor of an assigned
    right’”); 
    Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 932
    (“Although the recorded deed of trust here
    omitted Freddie Mac’s name, Freddie Mac’s property interest is valid and
    enforceable under Nevada law.”).
    3.     Equitable considerations do not require a different result. Saticoy Bay
    is not a bona fide purchaser because there was constructive notice of an adverse
    interest to the deed of trust. The deed of trust states on its first page that a “Rider”
    to the deed of trust is the “NEVADA-Single Family- Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac
    UNIFORM INSTRUMENT WITH MERS.” Moreover, there is no adequate
    remedy at law for what Fannie Mae seeks: an affirmance that it continues to have
    an interest in the property at issue. Finally, § 4617(j)(3) gives FHFA protection
    until it “affirmatively relinquishes it,” 
    Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 929
    , which
    necessarily precludes implying consent from inaction.
    3
    4.     Ditech and Fannie Mae request that we admonish Saticoy Bay for
    taking positions that are irreconcilable with published, on-point decisions. In light
    of the published cases foreclosing Saticoy’s arguments, Saticoy and its counsel are
    warned not to raise such meritless arguments in the future.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-16199

Filed Date: 2/20/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/20/2020