Jaime Solis-Solis v. William Barr ( 2020 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        SEP 9 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JAIME ERNESTO SOLIS-SOLIS, AKA                  No.    19-72138
    Jaime Ernesto Solis,
    Agency No. A213-020-392
    Petitioner,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted August 13, 2020**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: O'SCANNLAIN, CALLAHAN, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
    Jaime Ernesto Solis-Solis petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals’ (BIA’s) order dismissing his appeal and affirming the Immigration
    Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of his motion to suppress alienage evidence in his removal
    proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
     and we deny the
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    petition.
    Solis-Solis raises two challenges to the BIA’s order in his petition for
    review. First, Solis-Solis argues that the agency’s I-213 document—a form
    wherein agents summarize the evidence and their interactions with a suspect—was
    not admissible at his removal hearing because it contains contradictions that render
    it inherently unreliable. Specifically, the I-213 form states that the vehicle stop
    occurred “near” his residence and “[a]t [the] time” that Solis-Solis was observed
    leaving the house, whereas Solis-Solis and the driver of the vehicle both testified at
    the hearing that the vehicle was stopped more than a mile away and around forty
    minutes after they left the residence. Neither the IJ nor the BIA considered these
    discrepancies significant enough to render the I-213 inherently unreliable. We
    agree. While the descriptions in the I-213 could be clearer, the evidence does not
    compel the conclusion that there was a contradiction that rendered the form
    inherently unreliable.
    Second, Solis-Solis argues that the evidence resulting from the vehicle stop
    should have been suppressed at his hearing because the government lacked
    individualized reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. “An officer may make an
    investigatory stop if he is aware of specific, articulable facts which, together with
    objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting that the particular
    person detained is engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Hernandez-
    2
    Alvarado, 
    891 F.2d 1414
    , 1416 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 
    8 C.F.R. § 287.8
    (b)(2)
    (immigration officer may “briefly detain” a person on “reasonable suspicion” that
    he or she “is an alien illegally in the United States”). Here, the agents were
    conducting an operation that individually targeted Solis-Solis as a criminal alien,
    and stopped the vehicle in which he was a passenger after observing him leave his
    residence and following him. Thus, the agents had “specific, articulable” facts
    from which their reasonable suspicion for stopping the vehicle may be rationally
    deduced. See 
    id. at 1416
     (“Permissible deductions or rational inferences must be
    grounded in objective facts and be capable of rational explanation . . . .”). Solis-
    Solis argues that the agents had not verified that he was indeed the passenger in the
    vehicle before it was stopped. However, the agents did not need to know for
    certain that the vehicle passenger was Solis-Solis. They only needed to be able to
    infer from the facts that there was a reasonable probability that the passenger was
    Solis-Solis, and the facts here gave rise to such a probability. See Kansas v.
    Glover, 
    140 S. Ct. 1183
    , 1187 (2020) (“[T]he level of suspicion the standard
    requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
    evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” (quoting Prado
    Navarette v. California, 
    572 U.S. 393
    , 397 (2014))).
    The agency did not err by concluding that the I-213 form was not inherently
    unreliable and that the government was able to establish reasonable suspicion for
    3
    the vehicle stop under these circumstances. Solis-Solis’s petition for review is
    DENIED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-72138

Filed Date: 9/9/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/9/2020