Wishtoyo Foundation v. United Water Conserv. Dist. ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 26 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WISHTOYO FOUNDATION; CENTER                     No.    19-55380
    FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY;
    VENTURA COASTKEEPER, a Program of               D.C. No.
    Wishtoyo Foundation,                            2:16-cv-03869-DOC-PLA
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    UNITED WATER CONSERVATION
    DISTRICT,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted February 12, 2020
    Pasadena, California
    Before: BERZON, TALLMAN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
    United Water Conservation District (“United”) appeals the district court’s
    grant of judgment to plaintiffs (collectively, “Wishtoyo”) on their Endangered
    Species Act claim regarding take of Southern California Steelhead. We affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    1.     The district court properly held that the National Marine Fisheries
    Service (“NMFS”) and other regulatory agencies were not necessary parties under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1). The district court was careful to structure
    the injunction to provide relief to Wishtoyo without requiring the agencies’
    participation in the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A).
    United points to one sentence of the injunction providing that “NMFS shall
    respond promptly to a request for . . . assistance” when stranded fish need to be
    hauled or handled. In the context of the order as a whole, we do not read the
    district court’s use of the word “shall” as ordering NMFS to take certain action but
    rather as recognizing that the agency can be expected to respond promptly when
    fish are stranded.
    NMFS and the other regulatory agencies also have not claimed an interest
    relating to the subject of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B); Roberts v. City
    of Fairbanks, 
    947 F.3d 1191
    , 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2020).
    2.     The district court did not err in relying on NMFS’s incidental take
    statement in the biological opinion as one source of evidence that United’s
    operations were taking steelhead. The incidental take statement explained that
    “[o]perating the Vern Freeman Diversion Dam, even with the reasonable and
    prudent alternative, is expected to cause incidental take of the endangered Southern
    California DPS of steelhead,” and it specified the nature of the takes that were
    2
    expected. This “expected” language demonstrates that NMFS considered that takes
    of steelhead are “reasonably certain” to occur. Defs. of Wildlife v. Bernal, 
    204 F.3d 920
    , 925 (9th Cir. 2000). We therefore need not decide whether it would be proper
    to rely on a less definite incidental take statement as evidence of take in a citizen
    suit under section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 
    16 U.S.C. § 1538
    (a)(1)(B).
    3.     The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into
    evidence NMFS’s biological opinion and the testimony of NMFS officials. The
    introduction of the biological opinion was proper under the public records
    exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). The district court relied on the
    biological opinion as one data point among others, not to establish United’s
    liability. The NMFS officials were asked to testify by the district court; they were
    not expert witnesses for Wishtoyo who had not been disclosed. See Fed. R. Evid.
    614(a).
    4.     United does not challenge the district court’s award of attorney’s fees
    and costs to Wishtoyo except to request that this court vacate the fee award if it
    vacates the judgment. Because we affirm the judgment, we do not vacate the fee
    award.
    5.     We deny Wishtoyo’s motion for leave to file a surreply (Dkt. 41) and
    deny as moot Wishtoyo’s motion to strike United’s response to the proposed
    surreply (Dkt. 46). The district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law did
    3
    not rely upon the trial exhibits at issue; nor do we. So there is no need, for purposes
    of this appeal, to clarify whether they were admitted.
    The judgment is AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-55380

Filed Date: 2/26/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/26/2020