Craig Jalbert v. Xl Ins. America, Inc. ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JUN 10 2020
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CRAIG R. JALBERT, a Massachusetts                No.    19-55188
    citizen, as Trustee of the Vernon Tort
    Claims Trust,                                    D.C. No.
    2:17-cv-07167-GW-KS
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    XL INSURANCE AMERICA, INC., a
    Delaware corporation; ZURICH
    AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 2, 2020**
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: LIPEZ,*** RAWLINSON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Craig R. Jalbert, Trustee of the Vernon Tort Trust, appeals the district
    court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of XL Insurance America,
    Inc. (“XL”) and Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”). We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    Because this is a diversity action without any federal questions, California
    law governs our decision. See Hydro Sys., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 
    929 F.2d 472
    ,
    474 (9th Cir. 1991). Under California law, “[i]nterpretation of an insurance policy
    is a question of law and follows the general rules of contract interpretation,” which
    requires giving effect to the “mutual intention” of the parties. TRB Invs., Inc. v.
    Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 
    145 P.3d 472
    , 476 (Cal. 2006). The “mutual intention” of
    the parties is to be inferred from the written provisions of the contract based on
    their clear and explicit meaning. 
    Id. at 477
    .
    1. Jalbert argues that the lead-particulate and arsenic emissions were Exide
    Technologies, Inc.’s (“Exide”) “product,” which brought the underlying claims
    within coverage. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the term “product,” when used
    in an identical products-completed operations hazard (“PCOH”) exception to a
    ***
    The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, United States Circuit Judge for the
    First Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2
    pollution exclusion, to unambiguously mean “goods or services which the insured
    deals in as his stock or trade.” Hydro Sys., Inc., 
    929 F.2d at 475
     (citation omitted).
    Exide’s “stock or trade” were the lead ingots it marketed and sold to third parties,
    not the lead-particulate and arsenic emissions, thus the PCOH exception does not
    apply.
    2. Because Jalbert failed to address the district court’s reasoning for finding
    that the “your work” provision only applies to offsite contractor work, he waived
    the issue of whether the district court erred by not making XL and Zurich meet
    their burden on summary judgment to show when Exide’s work was completed.
    See Hillis v. Heineman, 
    626 F.3d 1014
    , 1019 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that,
    where the plaintiff did not address the court’s alternative ground on appeal, the
    plaintiff waived the issue). Even if not waived, these provisions do not apply
    because “PCOH exclusions generally refer to ‘accidents caused by defective
    workmanship which arise after completion of work by the insured on construction
    or service contracts,’” and not damage occurring from pollution. Hydro Sys., Inc.,
    
    929 F.2d at 477
     (citation omitted).
    3. Jalbert argues that XL’s pollution exclusion is unenforceable, because XL
    did not obtain prior approval from the California Department of Insurance as
    required by Proposition 103. However, the plain language of Proposition 103’s
    3
    implementing statute and its stated purpose only require the approval of “insurance
    rates,” not policy terms. See 
    Cal. Ins. Code § 1861.01
    (c). Therefore, Proposition
    103 does not make XL’s policies unenforceable.1
    AFFIRMED.2
    1
    Because the district court did not rely on the lead exclusion to find that the
    policies did not provide coverage for the underlying claims and because we affirm
    the district court’s ruling, we need not address Jalbert’s lead exclusion argument.
    2
    The motion to file an amicus brief is granted.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-55188

Filed Date: 6/10/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/10/2020