Teniya Davis v. Andrew Saul ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TENIYA G. DAVIS, No. 20-15236
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:18-cv-01968-APG-VCF
v.
ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF MEMORANDUM*
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 09, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW and BEA, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL,*** District
Judge.
Teniya G. Davis appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social
Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s order upholding the Commissioner’s
denial of benefits. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). We may
set aside the denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or
is based on legal error. Id.In finding that Davis was not “disabled” under the Social Security Act, the
administrative law judge (ALJ) gave “great weight” to mental health assessments by
three psychologists in connection with Davis’s application for benefits: Dr. Bonnie
Winkleman, Dr. Pamela Hawkins, and Dr. Timothy Schumacher. In May 2015, Dr.
Winkleman examined Davis and found that she “could understand, remember, and
carry out simple and a few detailed tasks without special supervision.” In August
2015, Dr. Hawkins reviewed Davis’s medical and non-medical records, which
included Dr. Winkleman’s report, and found that Davis would be able to sustain
“attention, concentration, persistence, and pace for simple and some detailed tasks”
and had “sufficient ability[,] understanding[,] and remembering [for] simple and
some 3–4 step tasks.” Dr. Hawkins also concluded that Davis could perform work
as an “addresser.” In December 2015, Dr. Schumacher reviewed Davis’s updated
record and found Dr. Hawkins’s assessment “accurate.”
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The ALJ ultimately found that Davis could “perform light work” involving
“simple tasks typical of unskilled occupations” with “no production rate pace work,”
only occasional interaction with coworkers, and no interaction with the public. The
ALJ then found that, considering Davis’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity to do work within the limits that applied, six kinds of
jobs existed “in significant numbers in the national economy that [Davis] can
perform.” All but one of those jobs require Reasoning Level 2.
The Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles identifies
occupational reasoning levels ranging from one (the simplest) to six (the most
complex). U.S. Dep’t Lab., Dictionary of Occupational Titles, App’x C, § III (4th
ed. 1991). The two lowest levels are relevant here:
• Reasoning Level 1 requires an employee to “[a]pply commonsense
understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step instructions” and “[d]eal
with standardized situations with occasional or no variables in or from these
situations encountered on the job”; and
• Reasoning Level 2 requires an employee to “[a]pply commonsense
understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral
instructions” and “[d]eal with problems involving a few concrete variables in
or from standardized situations.”
Id.
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Davis argues that the jobs the ALJ identified, which require Reasoning Level
2, are inconsistent with Dr. Hawkins and Dr. Schumacher’s opinions that she was
limited to “simple and some 3–4 step tasks.”1 However, substantial evidence in the
record supports the ALJ’s finding that Davis could perform these identified
positions. See Shaibi, 883 F.3d at 1110 n.7.
A finding that Davis had the residual functional capacity to do only one- or
two-step tasks would require the ALJ to find her able to perform jobs requiring no
more than Reasoning Level 1. See Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d
996, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2015) (a residual functional capacity limited to “one- and
two-step tasks” conflicted with the “demands” of positions requiring Reasoning
Level 2). But Dr. Schumacher and Dr. Hawkins agreed that Davis was not limited
to one- or two-step tasks. Both doctors found that she could perform “simple work,”
“some detailed work,” and “some 3–4 step tasks.” Dr. Winkleman also concluded
that Davis had the residual functional capacity for “simple employment” and could
carry out “simple and a few detailed tasks without special supervision.” Simple
work is consistent with positions requiring Reasoning Level 2. See Zavalin v.
Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846–47 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a residual functional
capacity limited to “simple, routine, or repetitive work” does not conflict with the
1
Both parties seem to agree that Davis’s residual functional capacity is inconsistent with jobs requiring
Reasoning Level 3. ALJ identified mail clerk, which requires Reasoning Level 3, as a potential job for
Davis. This finding was erroneous. But because the ALJ identified five other positions requiring Reasoning
Level 2, this error was harmless. See Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1110 n.7 (9th Cir. 2017).
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ability to perform Reasoning Level 2 positions). Indeed, Dr. Schumacher and Dr.
Hawkins both determined that Davis could perform work as an “addresser,” which
requires Reasoning Level 2.
Davis argues that the ALJ did not properly consider Dr. Winkleman’s
opinions about Davis’s “poor” judgment and mild to moderate difficulty in
responding to work pressure and interacting with others. However, the ALJ
incorporated Dr. Winkleman’s opinion into his findings on Davis’s residual
functional capacity. The ALJ limited Davis to “light work” involving “simple tasks”
that have “no production rate pace work,” only occasional interaction with
coworkers, and no interaction with the public. In doing so, the ALJ properly credited
Dr. Winkleman’s opinions and applied them to the residual functional capacity
finding. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n
ALJ’s assessment of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to
concentration, persistence, or pace where the assessment is consistent with
restrictions identified in the medical testimony.”).
The record confirms the district court’s conclusion that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision and that the ALJ correctly applied the law.
AFFIRMED
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