Gregory Barren, Sr. v. T. Robinson ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 25 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GREGORY D. BARREN, Sr., No. 14-16792
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00650-RLH-
CWH
v.
T. ROBINSON, et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Roger L. Hunt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 16, 2016**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Gregory D. Barren, Sr., appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging false arrest. We review de novo
cross-motions for summary judgment, Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of
San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011), and review for an abuse of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
discretion evidentiary rulings made in the context of summary judgment, Wong v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
because Barren failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
defendants had probable cause to arrest him. See United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d
1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (defining probable cause); Cabrera v. City of
Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (a plaintiff must
show there was no probable cause in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim for
false arrest).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by considering the 911-call
because it was considered for a non-hearsay purpose, and the arrest and domestic
violence reports because they were admissible under the “regularly conducted
activity” exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. § 803(6); United States v.
Pazsint, 703 F.2d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1983) (“It is well established that entries in a
police report which result from the officer’s own observations and knowledge may
be admitted” under Rule 803(6)). Further, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by not considering the letters purportedly authored by the alleged victim
because they were not authenticated. See Fed. R. Evid. § 901(a); Orr v. Bank of
Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing authentication
requirements in the summary judgment context).
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Defendants’ motion to file physical exhibits (Docket No. 9) is denied as
unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
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