Cristobal Hernandez, Jr. v. Janice Brewer ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                                                                     FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    AUG 26 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CRISTOBAL HERNANDEZ, JR.,                     No.   13-16826
    Plaintiff-Appellant,              D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01945-JAT
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JANICE K. BREWER, Governor of the
    State of Arizona, in her official capacity;
    MARK BRNOVICH, Assistant U.S.
    Attorney, Arizona Attorney General, in his
    official and individual capacities; STATE
    OF ARIZONA; COUNTY OF PINAL, a
    political subdivision of the State of
    Arizona; JAMES P. WALSH, in his
    official and individual capacities; PINAL
    COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS,
    in their official capacities; STEPHEN C.
    LEPLEY, Section Chief, Financial
    Remedies Section, in his official and
    individual capacities; KATRIN M.
    NELSON, Assistant Attorney General, in
    her official and individual capacities;
    ERIC J. HERRMANN, Assistant Attorney
    General, in his official and individual
    capacities; BARTON J. FEARS, Assistant
    Attorney General, in his official and
    individual capacities; MATTHEW D.
    CONTI, Assistant Attorney General, in his
    official and individual capacities; JANET
    GYGAX, Officer, Pinal County Attorney’s
    Office, in her official and individual
    capacities; PAUL R. BABEU, Sheriff, in
    his official and individual capacities;
    JAMES RIMMER, Pinal County Sheriff’s
    Office, in his official and individual
    capacities; BENJAMIN PARRY, Deputy
    Sheriff for the PCSO, in his individual and
    official capacities; TERRY L.
    GODDARD, husband; MONICA
    GODDARD, wife,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 4, 2016**
    Before: D.W. NELSON, GRABER, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    Cristobal Hernandez, Jr., appeals the district court’s order disposing of all of
    Hernandez’s twenty-two claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
    and we affirm.
    1. The district court properly dismissed Hernandez’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
    claim alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (count 7)
    against all Pinal County Defendants except Defendant Deputy Sheriff Parry. The
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2
    court properly concluded that Hernandez made only conclusory statements as to
    the alleged violations and that he failed to provide any factual basis for his claim.
    See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555 (2007).
    The district court’s grant of summary judgment to Deputy Parry on count 7
    was also proper. The court correctly ruled that there was no genuine dispute of
    material fact as to whether Deputy Parry had reasonable suspicion to stop
    Hernandez when he observed Hernandez operating a vehicle with a broken tail
    light. See United States v. Gutierrez-Mederos, 
    965 F.2d 800
    , 803 (9th Cir. 1992).
    The court also properly found that Deputy Parry’s request to Hernandez to “hold
    on” did not unreasonably prolong the stop, nor did it transform the stop into an
    arrest. See Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 
    308 F.3d 987
    , 991 (9th Cir. 2002).
    Further, Deputy Parry’s use of a police dog, which alerted around the driver’s door
    of Hernandez’s car, did not transform the stop into an arrest, and gave Deputy
    Parry probable cause to search the entire car. See Illinois v. Caballes, 
    543 U.S. 405
    , 409 (2005); United States v. Ibarra, 
    345 F.3d 711
    , 716 (9th Cir. 2003).
    Finally, the district court also properly granted summary judgment to Deputy Parry
    on qualified immunity grounds. See Hunter v. Bryant, 
    502 U.S. 224
    , 227 (1991)
    (per curiam).
    3
    2. The district court properly dismissed Hernandez’s claim alleging a
    violation under 18 U.S.C. § 961 (count 14), his state law claim of negligence
    (count 16), and his state law claim of gross negligence (count 17). The court
    properly concluded that Hernandez made only conclusory statements as to these
    counts, and he therefore failed to satisfy the pleading standard. See 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    ; 
    Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
    .
    3. The district court properly dismissed Hernandez’s state law claims
    alleging defamation, libel and/or false light (count 13), and negligent and
    intentional infliction of emotional distress (count 15). The statute of limitations
    bars those claims. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-821.
    4. The district court properly disregarded Hernandez’s allegations related to
    the October 21, 2009 traffic stop. Hernandez did not link any of the facts of the
    stop to any of the legal claims raised in the operative complaint.
    5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to address
    further Hernandez’s claims that Appellees were withholding discovery. See
    Preminger v. Peake, 
    552 F.3d 757
    , 768 n.10 (9th Cir. 2008). Hernandez repeatedly
    failed to comply with court-ordered procedures regarding discovery disputes.
    6. Hernandez’s claim that Appellees engaged in fraud upon the court fails.
    We vacate judgments for fraud upon the court “with restraint and discretion . . .
    4
    and only when the fraud is established by clear and convincing evidence.” United
    States v. Estate of Stonehill, 
    660 F.3d 415
    , 443 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). Hernandez is unable to satisfy his burden, and we
    therefore decline to vacate the district court’s judgment.
    7. On appeal, Hernandez did not adequately raise his arguments that the
    district court erroneously denied (1) his request for leave to file another amended
    complaint and (2) his motion for a change of venue. See Cruz v. Int’l Collection
    Corp., 
    673 F.3d 991
    , 998 (9th Cir. 2012). Even if Hernandez’s arguments are not
    waived, the district court properly denied those motions.1
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    In his briefing, it is unclear whether Hernandez attempted to raise more
    arguments on appeal. Because we review only the issues that “are argued
    specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief,” any other arguments are
    waived or forfeited. 
    Cruz, 673 F.3d at 998
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    5