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 2020-09

Holli Telford v. Montana Land Exchange ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        SEP 15 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HOLLI TELFORD,                                  No. 19-35891
Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00002-BMM-
KLD
v.
MONTANA LAND EXCHANGE; et al.,                  MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 8, 2020**
Before:      TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Holli Telford appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii). Watison v. Carter,
    668 F.3d 1108
    , 1112 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2012). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Telford’s federal claims because
Telford failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,
    556 U.S. 662
    , 679 (2009) (a plaintiff fails to show she is entitled to relief if
the complaint’s factual allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of [the alleged] misconduct”); see also Eclectic Props. E., LLC v.
Marcus & Millichap Co.,
    751 F.3d 990
    , 997 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth elements
of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim and the pleading
requirements to show the existence of an enterprise); Whitaker v. Garcetti,
    486 F.3d 572
    , 581 (9th Cir. 2007) (a plaintiff who sues a local government for violation
of a constitutional right must establish that the “local government had a deliberate
policy, custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional
violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Edwards v. Marin
Park, Inc.,
    356 F.3d 1058
    , 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing pleading standard
for Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) retaliation claim); Lovell v. Chandler,
    303 F.3d 1039
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth elements of a disability discrimination
claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act);
    24 C.F.R. § 100.600
    (a) (providing
that hostile environment harassment “because of” handicap may violate the FHA).
The district court properly dismissed Telford’s state law claims in her
seventh through eleventh causes of action because, for each claim, Telford failed to
2                                     19-35891
give defendants “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555 (2007) (alteration in original,
citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We reject as without merit Telford’s contention that the district judge should
have recused himself. See United States v. Hernandez,
    109 F.3d 1450
    , 1453-54
(9th Cir. 1997) (the substantive standard for recusal under
    28 U.S.C. § 144
     is
whether “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that
the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
3                                   19-35891