Doug Lair v. Jeff Mangan ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 22 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOUG LAIR; et al., No. 20-35700
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 6:12-cv-00012-CCL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFF MANGAN, in his official capacity as
the Montana Commissioner of Political
Practices; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Charles C. Lovell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 11, 2020**
Before: RAWLINSON, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Appellants Doug Lair, the Lake County Republican Central Committee, and
the Beaverhead County Republican Central Committee appeal from the district
court’s order denying their motion for post-judgment relief under Federal Rule of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion. Henson v.
Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc., 943 F.3d 434, 443 (9th Cir. 2019).
Upon review of the record, the opening brief, and the arguments raised in
appellants’ motion to expedite this appeal for decision, we conclude this matter is
suitable for decision without further briefing. See United States v. Hooton, 693
F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing standards for summary affirmance). We
therefore grant appellants’ motion to expedite this appeal (Docket Entry No. 3),
and we affirm the judgment.
Appellants challenge this court’s opinion in Lair v. Motl, 873 F.3d 1170 (9th
Cir. 2017) (“Lair III”), cert. denied sub nom. Lair v. Mangan, 139 S. Ct. 916(2019). In Lair III, this court reversed the judgment of the district court and upheld
Montana’s campaign contribution limits under the standard set forth in Montana
Right to Life Association v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). Appellants
contend that the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Thompson v. Hebdon, 140 S. Ct.
348 (2019), constitutes a change in the controlling law because it requires courts to
apply the factors outlined in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), as opposed to
Eddleman, and therefore requires reversal of Lair III. We disagree.
The panel’s opinion in Lair III gave reasoned consideration to the question
of whether Montana’s contribution limits raised any of the “danger signs” outlined
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in Randall. See Lair III, 873 F.3d at 1186-87. Finding none, the panel concluded
that Montana’s contribution limits “would survive scrutiny even if Randall
governed.” Id. at 1187. The panel’s prior conclusion on this issue, “germane to
the eventual resolution of the case,” remains the binding law of this circuit. See
United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]here a panel
confronts an issue germane to the eventual resolution of the case, and resolves it
after reasoned consideration in a published opinion, that ruling becomes the law of
the circuit, regardless of whether doing so is necessary in some strict logical
sense.”).
The district court correctly determined that this court, in Lair III, had in fact
considered Randall in its analysis. Because the panel’s Lair III opinion previously
confronted and resolved the issue raised by appellants, we remain bound by its
conclusion. See Johnson, 256 F.3d at 914. The district court properly concluded
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson does not require reversal of Lair
III, and thus properly denied appellant’s motion for relief from the judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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