Albert Robinson v. San Bernardino County ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 10 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALBERT ROBINSON, No. 19-55893
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:18-cv-00906-VAP-ADS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 5, 2020**
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Albert Robinson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of
defendants’ failure to appoint him counsel at his initial state court criminal
arraignment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
district court’s judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c). Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Robinson’s Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to counsel claims because Robinson failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that he was denied counsel during a critical stage in his state
court criminal proceedings. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., 554 U.S. 191,
194, 212 (2008) (explaining that, once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
applies, a criminal defendant is entitled to counsel “during any critical stage” of the
proceedings); United States v. Benford, 574 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that a critical stage is one where “(1) failure to pursue strategies or
remedies results in a loss of significant rights, (2) skilled counsel would be useful
in helping the accused understand the legal confrontation,” or “(3) the proceeding
tests the merits of the accused’s case” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Robinson’s § 1983 conspiracy claim
because Robinson failed to allege facts sufficient to show the existence of a
conspiracy or an underlying constitutional violation. See Crowe v. County of San
Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth elements of a § 1983
conspiracy claim); Simmons v. Sacramento Cty. Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156,
1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “conclusory allegations” are insufficient to
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state a conspiracy claim under § 1983).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Robinson’s state law fraud claims because the court
dismissed the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 940 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Robinson’s
complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile.
See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir.
2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave
to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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