Jerry Wood v. Kevin Young ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 11 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JERRY GEORGE WOOD, No. 19-35791
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00983-MJP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KEVIN YOUNG; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
DAN STITES, Captain; et al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 4, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit
Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Jerry George Wood appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
default judgment and grant of summary judgment in his § 1983 action. We have
jurisdiction under U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
The district court’s denial of Wood’s motion for default judgment does not
constitute a final order and is therefore not appealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Bird
v. Reese, 875 F.2d 256, 256 (9th Cir. 1989) (order denying a motion for default
judgment is not a final appealable order). We previously dismissed Wood’s appeal
of this very same order. See Wood v. Young, et al., No. 19-35059 (9th Cir. Feb. 25,
2019).
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Branch
Banking & Trust Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 2019). The
district court properly granted summary judgment on Wood’s access to courts
claim, brought pursuant to the enforcement of an order of the Snohomish County
Superior Court stating that Wood’s “use of [the] telephone, visitation privileges,
use of [the] library, and mail privileges are restricted to allow only contact with
defense counsel and/or persons with their firm.” Appellees Kevin Young, Daniel
Young, Mirra Merkel, and Jacob Taylor, all Snohomish County Corrections
employees, “are charged with executing facially valid court orders,” and therefore
“enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by those
orders.” Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2013).
2
Snohomish County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Matthew Baldock, who Wood
contends took part in issuing the order, similarly enjoys absolute immunity from
Wood’s claim. See Patterson v. Van Arsdel, 883 F.3d 826, 829–30 (9th Cir. 2018)
(noting that prosecutors “are absolutely immune against suits under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 that arise from their performance of prosecutorial functions”).
The district court also correctly granted summary judgment on Wood’s
conditions of confinement claim, stemming from his placement in a cell without a
regular bed frame, table, or chair. As a pretrial detainee, Wood had “a substantive
due process right against restrictions that amount to punishment,” Simmons v.
Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)), but “[r]estraints that are
reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not,
without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 540 (1979). The district court noted that Wood’s cell, on a restrictive unit,
“did not normally contain a chair, desk, or table,” and Wood’s placement on the
unit was effected “to prevent him from having contact with other inmates in light
of the new allegations in his criminal case that he had attempted to solicit another
inmate to kidnap and murder witnesses against him in his pending criminal case.”
Similarly, he was provided with a modified bedframe after being observed
“slamming his bed frame against the door.” Wood’s housing assignment, and the
3
conditions he found there, were accordingly “reasonably related to the institution’s
interest in maintaining jail security.” Id.
AFFIRMED.
4