Hudena James v. U.S. Bank National Association ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 12 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    HUDENA JAMES; MERCEDES GREEN,                   Nos. 19-55514
    19-55544
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    D.C. No. 5:18-cv-01762-RGK-SP
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    U.S. BANCORP, a business entity, form
    unknown,
    Defendant,
    and
    KATHY SANDOVAL, an Individual; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 5, 2020**
    Before:      SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Hudena James and Mercedes Green appeal pro se from the district court’s
    order dismissing their 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
     action alleging discrimination and state
    law claims arising out of the denial of plaintiffs’ request to open a bank account.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal for
    failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes
    v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
    656 F.3d 1034
    , 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm
    in part, reverse in part, and remand.
    The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for intentional
    infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) because plaintiffs failed to allege facts
    sufficient to show that defendants’ actions were outrageous. See Hughes v. Pair,
    
    209 P.3d 963
    , 976 (Cal. 2009) (elements of an IIED claim).
    The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for negligent infliction
    of emotional distress (“NIED”) because plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to
    show that defendants owed a duty to plaintiffs. See McMahon v. Craig, 
    97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555
    , 560-61 (Ct. App. 2009) (elements of NIED claim).
    The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for negligent
    supervision or retention of an employee because plaintiffs failed to allege facts
    sufficient to show that defendants knew or should have known that their hiring
    decisions were negligent. See Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 
    52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376
    ,
    397 (Ct. App. 2006) (elements of negligent supervision or retention).
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    19-55544
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend
    plaintiffs’ claims for IIED, NIED and negligent supervision or retention of an
    employee because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes, 
    656 F.3d at 1041
     (setting forth standard of review and explaining that denial of leave to amend
    is proper when amendment would be futile).
    The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims under § 1981 and California’s
    Unruh Act for failure to state a claim. However, plaintiffs’ allegations, liberally
    construed, were sufficient to show intentional discrimination. See Starr v. Baca,
    
    652 F.3d 1202
    , 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If there are two alternative explanations,
    one advanced by defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of which are
    plausible, plaintiff’s complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule
    12(b)(6).”); Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, 
    447 F.3d 1138
    , 1145 (9th Cir. 2006)
    (elements of § 1981 claim in a commercial, non-employment context); Munson v.
    Del Taco, Inc., 
    94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685
    , 692-93 (Ct. App. 2009) (to state a claim
    under the Unruh Act premised on racial discrimination, a plaintiff must plead
    intentional discrimination). We reverse the judgment as to the district court’s
    dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under § 1981 and California’s Unruh Act, and
    remand for further proceedings as to those claims only.
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    3                                       19-55514
    19-55544
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    We do not consider facts not presented to the district court. See United
    States v. Elias, 
    921 F.2d 870
    , 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
    Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.
    The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
    AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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    19-55544