Atain Specialty Insurance Comp v. Armory Studios, LLC ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 13 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ATAIN SPECIALTY INSURANCE                       No.    19-15745
    COMPANY, a Michigan corporation,
    D.C. No. 3:15-cv-05124-JD
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    ARMORY STUDIOS, LLC, a California
    limited liability company; PETER
    ACWORTH, an individual,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ATAIN SPECIALTY INSURANCE                       No.    19-15820
    COMPANY, a Michigan corporation,
    D.C. No. 3:15-cv-05124-JD
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    ARMORY STUDIOS, LLC, a California
    limited liability company; PETER
    ACWORTH, an individual,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    James Donato, District Judge, Presiding
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Argued and Submitted July 15, 2020
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SILER,** TALLMAN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    The district court held that Atain Specialty Insurance Company (Atain) did
    not have a duty to defend Armory Studios, LLC (Armory) and Armory’s principal,
    Peter Acworth, in underlying state court lawsuits and that Atain is not entitled to
    reimbursement of a settlement paid in one of those underlying lawsuits, Adams v.
    Kink.com, et al., No. CGC–15–547035 (San Francisco Super. Ct.). We affirm.
    First, we conclude that the district court did not err when it determined that
    Atain had no duty to defend Armory or Acworth in the underlying lawsuits. Under
    California law, an insurer must defend its insured against a third-party lawsuit if
    there is a “bare possibility of coverage.” Belmonte v. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 
    99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661
    , 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). Therefore, we compare “the allegations of the
    complaint with the terms of the policy” and determine whether the facts alleged
    together with the facts known to the insurer at the inception of a lawsuit or tender of
    defense reveal a possibility that the claim is covered. Montrose Chemical Corp. v.
    Superior Court, 
    861 P.2d 1153
    , 1157 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
    Atain argues that the “Physical-Sexual Abuse Exclusion” precludes coverage.
    **
    The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2                                    19-15745
    The exclusion precludes coverage of “any ‘occurrence,’ suit, . . . or causes of action
    arising out of or resulting from the physical abuse, sexual abuse or licentious,
    immoral or sexual behavior intended to lead to, or culminating in any sexual act,
    whether caused by, or at the instigation of, or at the direction of, or omission by: The
    insured or the insured’s employees . . . .” Here, the exclusion applies because the
    state court complaints asserted that Armory and Acworth were liable for the
    plaintiffs’ contraction of HIV while plaintiffs were engaging in sexual acts at the
    direction of Armory and Acworth, among others. And the omissions clause
    precludes causes of action arising out of any sexual act that resulted from the
    omission of the insured, which covers the complaint allegations that Armory and
    Acworth failed to discover dangerous conditions caused by their tenants and failed
    to ensure their tenants were following required procedures. Thus, Atain had no duty
    to defend against any causes of action.
    Second, we conclude that Atain is not entitled to reimbursement of the Adams
    action settlement. To be entitled to reimbursement Atain must show that it satisfied
    each of the following requirements: “(1) a timely and express reservation of rights;
    (2) an express notification to the insureds of the insurer’s intent to accept a proposed
    settlement offer; and (3) an express offer to the insureds that they may assume their
    own defense when the insurer and insureds disagree whether to accept the proposed
    settlement.” Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 
    22 P.3d 313
    , 320–21 (Cal. 2001). Atain
    3                                    19-15745
    did not satisfy the third requirement because it never made an express offer to
    Armory that it could assume its own defense. Therefore, Atain is not entitled to
    reimbursement of the Adams action settlement.
    Each party to bear its own costs.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                              19-15745
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-15745

Filed Date: 8/13/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/13/2020