Andrey Cherba v. William Barr ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    AUG 18 2020
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ANDREY CHERBA,                                   No.   17-73396
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A071-378-762
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted August 13, 2020**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: HAWKINS and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and GRITZNER,*** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the
    Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
    Andrey Cherba petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
    denial of his fourth motion to reopen his removal proceedings. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a). Reviewing for abuse of discretion,
    INS v. Abudu, 
    485 U.S. 94
    , 107 (1988), we deny the petition.
    1.     The immigration court properly exercised jurisdiction over Cherba’s
    removal proceeding. Citing Pereira v. Sessions, 
    138 S. Ct. 2105
     (2018), Cherba
    argues the Board should have vacated his removal order because his Notice to
    Appear was defective. This argument is foreclosed by Karingithi v. Whitaker, 
    913 F.3d 115
    , 116 (9th Cir. 2019) (“A notice to appear need not include time and date
    information to . . . [meet] the regulatory requirements and . . . [vest] jurisdiction in
    the [Immigration Judge].”).
    2.     The parties do not dispute that Cherba’s motion to reopen is untimely
    and exceeds the number of motions allowed by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). These bars
    do not apply if a motion to reopen is “based on changed country conditions arising
    in the . . . country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material
    and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the
    previous proceeding.” Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
    The Board did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Cherba was not
    entitled to reopen his proceedings based on his argument that conditions for
    2
    Baptists in Ukraine have materially changed since 2011. Cherba argued that
    Baptists suffered persecution when Ukraine was a member of the Soviet Union, but
    the Soviet Union dissolved years before Cherba arrived in the United States in
    1997. Cherba points to isolated incidents of present violence in Ukraine against
    Baptists, but does not meaningfully compare these incidents to conditions in 2011.
    In addition, the violence was committed by pro-Russian separatists, and in Eastern
    Ukraine, where Cherba does not have family.
    We uphold the Board’s factual findings in support of a denial of a motion to
    reopen if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. INS v.
    Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992). Here, substantial evidence supports the
    Board’s conclusion that Cherba would be ineligible for asylum, even if the merits
    of his claim were considered. Cherba presented no evidence he was persecuted in
    Ukraine on account of his religion, or that he was classified as a refugee on that
    basis when he was admitted to the United States in 1997. Robleto-Pastora v.
    Holder, 
    591 F.3d 1051
    , 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2010); Diaz-Torres v. Barr, 
    963 F.3d 976
    , 981 (9th Cir. 2020). Cherba did not show a well-founded fear of persecution
    because he could relocate away from Eastern Ukraine. Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr,
    
    918 F.3d 1025
    , 1029 (9th Cir. 2019). The record does not compel a contrary
    conclusion.
    3
    The Board did not abuse its discretion by concluding Cherba was not
    entitled to reopening based on his argument that conditions in Ukraine have
    materially changed for political activists. Cherba presented no evidence of
    materially changed conditions for political activists. Neither Cherba’s petition, nor
    the record, demonstrate why evidence of political persecution was unavailable in
    2011. In any case, substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that
    Cherba failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum based on his political
    views. Cherba cites violence against socialist politicians and political bloggers but
    cites no evidence that he is similarly situated. Najmabadi v. Holder, 
    597 F.3d 983
    ,
    992 (9th Cir. 2010). Cherba offered no evidence to substantiate his claim that his
    Americanized appearance will cause him to be perceived by extreme nationalists as
    holding pro-Western political views.
    Cherba also argues he is a member of two proposed social groups,
    “internally displaced persons,” and “apparent Americans.” The Board concluded
    neither was cognizable, and Cherba failed to show membership in either group.
    Cherba argues he is not presently employed in Ukraine and does not own a house
    or rent an apartment there. Neither are immutable traits. Cherba did not provide
    evidence that people with Americanized appearance, speech, and manner are
    targeted for violence and harm in Ukraine based on these characteristics. Cherba’s
    4
    claim that he would be persecuted as a displaced person and “widely believed to be
    pro Russian” failed for a similar reason. Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 
    367 F.3d 1206
    ,
    1211–12 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that persons “displaced by the inevitable
    ravages of war” do not receive protected status). Cherba fails to show that the
    record compels a contrary conclusion.
    3.     Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Cherba
    failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief pursuant to the Convention
    Against Torture. Cherba does not allege he will be tortured by government
    officials or by Ukranian nationalists operating with government acquiescence.
    Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 
    458 F.3d 1052
    , 1059 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.18
    (a)(1)). Cherba’s argument that the Ukrainian government puts up
    minimal resistance to violent and incredibly dangerous conditions is insufficient.
    
    Id.
    The Board did not abuse its discretion by denying Cherba’s fourth motion to
    reopen his removal proceedings.
    PETITION DENIED.
    5