Ramie Akonjang v. Robert Wilkinson ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 8 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAMIE BOMO AKONJANG, No. 19-71981
Petitioner, Agency No. A208-123-338
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting
Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 3, 2021**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: W. FLETCHER, MILLER, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
Ramie Bomo Akonjang, a native and citizen of Cameroon, seeks review of
an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing Akonjang’s appeal from
an immigration judge’s denial of his application for relief under the Convention
Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding.
First, the Board concluded that Akonjang “could not consistently identify which
bones were broken” during his alleged capture and beating and “ultimately
admitted that he had hurt his ankle,” not his leg as he initially testified. While the
immigration judge “consider[ed] it possible that [Akonjang’s] testimony was
simply an attempt to narrow down the specific body part that was broken,” the
immigration judge rejected that explanation because the inconsistency was similar
to “other occasions throughout [Akonjang’s] testimony in which he quickly
changed his answer to the questions posed.” Akonjang does not challenge that
finding or otherwise attempt to explain this inconsistency.
Second, the Board found that Akonjang testified inconsistently about the
existence of evidence documenting his broken bones. Akonjang claims that in
testifying that such evidence existed, he understood the immigration judge to be
asking about evidence of any injuries he sustained. But Akonjang answered “Yes,”
in response to the direct question, “Do you have documentary proof that you had
bones broken during this 21 day beating you suffered?,” even though he did not.
The record does not compel the conclusion that Akonjang testified consistently on
this issue. See Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2007) (agency need
not “interpret the evidence in the manner advocated by” the applicant). The
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inconsistencies cited by the Board regarding the nature and extent of Akonjang’s
injuries carry “substantial weight” and support the adverse credibility finding.
Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
Third, the Board concluded that Akonjang testified inconsistently by
testifying that his uncle knew that Akonjang and his brothers were still alive,
before admitting that he did not know whether that was true. Because this
testimony concerned “whether his uncle continued to target him,” the Board
concluded that it bore “directly on [his] claim.” This finding is supported by
substantial evidence, and Akonjang does not contend otherwise.
Fourth, the Board did not err in considering the inconsistencies between
Akonjang’s testimony and his affidavit regarding the length of his stay in Yaoundé,
Cameroon and whether he worked while living in Senegal. Although these minor
inconsistencies, taken alone, might not be sufficient to support an adverse
credibility finding, the agency “may consider any inconsistency” in its credibility
analysis. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010). Assuming,
without deciding, that the agency erred in determining that Akonjang testified
inconsistently on the separate issue of the length of his stay in Senegal, multiple
independent bases support the adverse credibility finding.
The record does not support Akonjang’s contention that the agency failed to
consider evidence that he testified consistently. Nor does Akonjang identify facts
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ignored by the agency that resolve the inconsistencies identified above. See
Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044. To the extent Akonjang attributes those inconsistencies
to a language barrier, the Board correctly deemed that argument to be waived,
because Akonjang had “confirmed on six occasions that he spoke and understood
English,” and his “counsel did not raise any concerns about [his] fluency in
English during the individual hearing.”
2. Akonjang argues that the agency incorrectly faulted him for lacking
corroborating evidence without providing notice that such evidence was required.
Although the immigration judge referenced the lack of corroborating evidence in
evaluating Akonjang’s credibility, the Board upheld the immigration judge’s
adverse credibility finding on the basis of “multiple grounds unrelated to [lack of]
corroboration.” As discussed above, that conclusion is supported by substantial
evidence. “Because the [agency] found [Akonjang’s] testimony not credible, the
[agency] was not required to give [him] notice and an opportunity to provide
additional corroborating evidence.” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th
Cir. 2020).
3. The Board separately concluded that the corroborating evidence
Akonjang submitted did not, on its own, satisfy the standard for obtaining relief
under the Convention Against Torture. See Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927
(independent evidence can support relief “even where an applicant has been
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deemed not credible”). Akonjang does not challenge that conclusion. He contends
only that the agency “overlooked” two documents showing that he is wanted by the
Cameroonian authorities, but those documents were expressly considered by the
Board and the immigration judge.
4. Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility
finding, and because Akonjang does not claim that, excluding his testimony, he is
otherwise entitled to relief, we need not reach the agency’s alternate finding that
Akonjang could safely relocate within Cameroon. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048–
49, 1048 n.6.
PETITION DENIED.
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