Damon Williams v. Prk Funding Services, Inc. ( 2020 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
AUG 24 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAMON CHARLES WILLIAMS, No. 19-35746
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00048-RSM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PRK FUNDING SERVICES, INC.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 20, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Damon Charles Williams appeals pro se from district court orders
granting motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment in favor of
defendants. Because the parties are familiar with the facts of the case we need not
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
recount them here. We review de novo the district court’s rulings on the motions
to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939
F.2d 702, 706 (9th Cir. 1991). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
we affirm.
1. The district court did not err in finding that the sale of the property did
not violate the automatic bankruptcy stay effected by the filing of Williams’s
personal bankruptcy petition. State law determines what property interests are
protected by the automatic stay created by the filing of a bankruptcy petition. See
11 U.S.C. § 362(a); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979). “Under
Washington law, an LLC member has no ownership interest in specific LLC
property and an LLC’s assets . . . are not part of the [personal] estate.” In re
Disciplinary Proceeding Against McGrath, 308 P.3d 615, 625-26 (Wa. 2013).
Because Williams transferred all his ownership interest in the property to Williams
Family Holding, LLC in 2005, the property was not part of his personal estate and
the stay effected by his personal bankruptcy filing did not protect the property.
2. The district court also did not err in finding that Williams’s state law
claims are time barred. Williams knew about the actions giving rise to his claims
by at least 2010 and did not file suit until 2018. The longest statute of limitations
applicable to his claims is six years, and most are three years. See RCW 4.16.080
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(providing a three year statute of limitations for claims based on non-written
contracts, trespass, negligence, tortious interference, general torts, and fraud);
id. 4.16.040 (providing a six year statute of limitations for claims based on a
contract in writing); Hudson v. Condon, 6 P.3d 615, 619 (Wa. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that a three year statute of limitations applies to breach of fiduciary duty
claims sounding in tort). In addition, the delayed discovery rule does not apply to
toll Williams’s claims because he knew of his injury when he lost the property and
was ordered evicted. See Matter of Estates of Hibbard, 826 P.2d 690, 696 (Wa.
1992) (discovery rule “limited to claims in which the plaintiffs could not have
immediately known of their injuries” or “the cause of their injuries”).
3. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor
of defendants Daniel Jensen, Ricci Frisk, and Donald Capp. There was no state
action for these state employees to review, so Williams was not injured by any
alleged failure to act. See WAC 458-20-100(1); RCW 34.12.020. His 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim also fails because he was not deprived of any liberty or property
interest. See Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED.
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