United States v. Juan Angulo-Cabrera ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NOV 15 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-50451
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:13-cr-00889-GHK-2
v.
JUAN GABRIEL ANGULO-CABRERA, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-50496
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:13-cr-00889-GHK-3
v.
SERGIO MERCADO-VAZQUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. King, District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Submitted November 9, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and SMITH,*** Chief District
Judge.
Defendants in this consolidated case were both sentenced for their respective
roles in a thirty-pound methamphetamine transaction. Defendant Angulo-Cabrera
appeals his sentence on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel (“IAC”) during the sentencing proceedings. Defendant Mercado-Vazquez
challenges the district court’s denial of safety-valve relief from mandatory-
minimum sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) as well as the district court’s
decision not to sua sponte order an evidentiary hearing to judge his credibility
during those proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, dismiss
Angulo’s IAC claim with prejudice, and affirm Mercado’s sentence.
A. Angulo-Cabrera
Angulo claims that it was deficient for his counsel to “unnecessarily concede
that there were more members in the criminal conspiracy” because doing so
undermined the Probation Office’s recommended downward variance. Under
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable William E. Smith, United States Chief District Judge
for the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), there is a two-prong test for
establishing an IAC claim: (1) deficient assistance of counsel and (2) prejudice as
a result. Id. at 687. Because Angulo failed to establish the first prong, we need not
reach the second.
We generally do not review challenges to the effectiveness of defense
counsel on direct appeal and instead prefer challenges in habeas proceedings. See,
e.g., United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 2012). There are two
“extraordinary exceptions to this general rule: (1) where the record on appeal is
sufficiently developed to permit determination of the issue, or (2) where the legal
representation is so inadequate that it obviously denies a defendant his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.” Id. (quoting United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d
1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2005)). The present case falls under the first exception.
Under a “most deferential” standard, starting with the “‘strong presumption’
that [Angulo’s] counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable
professional assistance,” we find that Angulo’s counsel’s representation did not
“amount[] to incompetence.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104–05 (2011)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Instead, it is clear from the record that
Angulo’s counsel was pursuing a reasonable strategy designed to minimize
Angulo’s role in the conspiracy by painting him as a minion of higher-ups, rather
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than as a drug kingpin for whom a harsh sentence may be warranted. See Miles v.
Ryan, 713 F.3d 477, 487 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying an IAC claim because defense
counsel’s sentencing argument “appear[ed] to have been motivated by reasonable
strategic concerns”). Because Angulo’s counsel followed a valid litigation
strategy, we dismiss his IAC claim with prejudice.
B. Mercado-Vazquez
Mercado appeals his 120-month sentence on the grounds that he was
improperly denied safety-valve relief and that the district court should have sua
sponte granted an evidentiary hearing to judge his credibility before ruling that his
safety-valve proffers were untruthful and incomplete.
To be eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), a defendant
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he meets five
criteria. United States v. Diaz-Cardenas, 351 F.3d 404, 408–09 (9th Cir. 2003).
The district court held that Mercado failed the last criterion to “truthfully provide[]
to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). This factual determination is reviewed for clear
error. United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1996).
The district court did not clearly err in making this factual determination and
denying safety-valve relief. The district court based its decision on the provable
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falsity of Mercado’s explanation for why he did not hear or see anything at the
drug meeting in question in combination with logical inferences drawn from an
agent’s statements that Mercado participated and the proximity of Mercado to the
transaction. This was not clear error. See United States v. Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131,
1145 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding a reasonable inference that the defendant must have
known more than he shared with the government a permissible ground to deny
relief).
Mercado further claims that the district court erred by not sua sponte
ordering an evidentiary hearing to judge his credibility. This decision is reviewed
for plain error. United States v. Berry, 258 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2001). Because
the district court’s findings were based on the objective falsehood of Mercado’s
statement and Mercado was given ample opportunity to contest the district court’s
findings, the district court did not plainly err. See United States v. Real-
Hernandez, 90 F.3d 356, 362 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that when a factual issue is in
dispute in a safety-valve application, the district court need only “provide the
parties a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to present information to the court” (quoting
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A))).
***
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Angulo-Cabrera’s IAC claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and
Mercado-Vazquez’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
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