Patrick Brady v. Scott Jones ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 20 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK BRADY, No. 21-16386
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00489-TLN-AC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SCOTT JONES, Sheriff; ERIK MANESS,
Sheriff; BRANDON LUKE, Commander;
SHAUN HAMPTUN, Deputy Sheriff;
SAIKA, Sargent; VILLANUEVA, Sargant;
DONALD WASHINGTON, U.S. Marshal’s
National Director; LASHA BOYDEN, U.S.
Marshal; HEADLY; MEEKS; FISHER;
PFAU,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 14, 2023**
Before: SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Former California pretrial detainee Patrick Brady appeals pro se from the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v.
Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand.
The district court properly dismissed Brady’s claim that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his safety because Brady failed to allege facts sufficient
to show that defendants exposed Brady to a substantial risk of serious harm. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately
indifferent only if he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he [or she] must
also draw the inference”).
The district court dismissed Brady’s due process claim arising from his
placement in a Total Separation Unit on the ground that Brady failed to allege facts
sufficient to show punitive intent on the part of any defendant. However, Brady
alleged that the reasons given for his placement in the Total Separation Unit did
not justify such a restrictive housing designation. Liberally construed, these
allegations are sufficient to state a plausible due process claim. See Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (pretrial detainees have a substantive due process right to
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be free from restrictions that amount to punishment); Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302
F.3d 1039, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[P]unitive intent can be inferred from the
nature of the restriction. This determination . . . will generally turn upon whether
an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether the restriction appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned to it.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
The district court dismissed Brady’s claim for violation of his right to confer
privately with counsel because Brady failed to demonstrate any resulting injury to
his defense in his criminal case. However, a showing of actual injury to a legal
claim is not required to state a claim for violation of attorney-client confidentiality
under the First and Sixth Amendments. See Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d
1204, 1212 (9th Cir. 2017) (allegation that the right to privately confer with
counsel has been chilled is sufficient to state a First Amendment claim; prisoner
does not need to “show any actual injury beyond the free speech violation itself to
state a constitutional claim” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Mangiaracina
v. Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2017) (violation of attorney-client
confidentiality in connection with a criminal case is actionable under the Sixth
Amendment).
In sum, we affirm the judgment as to Brady’s deliberate indifference to
safety claim, reverse the judgment as to Brady’s claims related to his placement in
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the Total Separation Unit and interference with his confidential legal visits, and
remand for further proceedings.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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