Iniguez-Montes v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    MAR 20 2023
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    Eva Iniguez-Montes,                            No. 21-446
    Petitioner,                       Agency No.       A070-917-691
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 15, 2023**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: LEE, BRESS, MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner Eva Iniguez-Montes, native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
    review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order upholding an
    Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Iniguez-Montes’ Motion to Reopen
    Removal Proceedings. Because the BIA affirmed the IJ without opinion, “we
    evaluate the IJ’s decision as we would that of the Board.” Lanza v. Ashcroft,
    
    389 F.3d 917
    , 925 (9th Cir. 2004). We review the denial of a motion to reopen
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
    precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    for abuse of discretion. Sembiring v. Gonzales, 
    499 F.3d 981
    , 985 (9th Cir.
    2007). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and we deny the petition
    for review.
    The agency did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Iniguez-Montes
    failed to rebut the presumption of effective service by regular mail. See Mejia-
    Hernandez v. Holder, 
    633 F.3d 818
    , 822 (9th Cir. 2011). Iniguez-Montes
    admits that the Notice to Appear and removal order were mailed to the correct
    address. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (“The written notice . . . shall be
    considered sufficient . . . if provided at the most recent address provided [by the
    noncitizen].”). Beyond her unsubstantiated assertion that she did not receive
    notice, Iniguez-Montes provided no other evidence indicating non-receipt. The
    removal order was not returned to the Immigration Court as undeliverable.
    Moreover, the agency did not abuse its discretion in finding Iniguez-
    Montes failed to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Iniguez-
    Montes failed to meet the procedural requirements set forth in Matter of
    Lozada, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 637
    , 639 (B.I.A. 1988). She did not submit an affidavit
    setting forth in detail her agreement with prior counsel, and the record lacks any
    evidence that prior counsel was notified of Iniguez-Montes’ allegations. See
    Azanor v. Ashcroft, 
    364 F.3d 1013
    , 1023 (9th Cir. 2004); Reyes v. Ashcroft, 
    358 F.3d 592
    , 598–99 (9th Cir. 2004). Nor did Iniguez-Montes establish that “the
    ineffectiveness of counsel was plain on its face.” Guan v. Barr, 
    925 F.3d 1022
    ,
    1033 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Tamang v. Holder, 
    598 F.3d 1083
    , 1090 (9th Cir.
    2                                    21-446
    2010)).
    The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.
    PETITION DENIED.
    3                                   21-446