James Jones v. Andrew Saul ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 28 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JAMES KEVIN JONES,                              No.    18-15756
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:16-cv-04433-JAT
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
    Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 26, 2020**
    Before:      LEAVY, CLIFTON, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    James Kevin Jones appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
    benefits and supplemental social security income under Titles II and XVI of the
    Social Security Act (Act). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g). We review de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 
    827 F.3d 872
    , 875 (9th
    Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
    The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided specific, clear, and
    convincing reasons to discount Jones’ symptom testimony as unsupported by the
    objective medical evidence, as inconsistent with Jones’ daily activities, for failure
    to comply with treatment recommendations, and as contradicted by Jones’
    testimony, which suggested a lack of motivation to work. See Burch v. Barnhart,
    
    400 F.3d 676
    , 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ may consider a lack of corroborating
    medical evidence as one factor in the credibility determination); Orn v. Astrue, 
    495 F.3d 625
    , 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony if the
    claimant’s daily activities contradict the testimony or if the daily activities meet the
    threshold for transferable work skills); Molina v. Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1113-14
    (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ may rely on failure to comply with treatment
    recommendations in discounting a claimant’s testimony); Tommasetti v. Astrue,
    
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony
    about the severity of his symptoms by offering specific, clear and convincing
    reasons). Any error in the ALJ’s additional reasons for discounting Jones’
    symptom testimony was harmless. See Molina, 
    674 F.3d at 1115
     (error is harmless
    where it is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”).
    2
    The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for assigning little weight
    to the controverted opinions of Drs. Atiemo and Geohas as inconsistent with the
    objective medical evidence, as based on subjective complaints, and as conclusory
    and providing little explanation. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    359 F.3d 1190
    , 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (an ALJ may reject a medical opinion that is
    unsupported by objective medical findings); Molina, 
    674 F.3d at 1111
     (this court
    “must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably
    drawn from the record”); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 
    242 F.3d 1144
    , 1149 (9th Cir.
    2001) (“When confronted with conflicting medical opinions, an ALJ need not
    accept a treating physician’s opinion that is conclusory and brief and unsupported
    by clinical findings”). Any error in the ALJ’s additional reasons for discounting
    Drs. Atiemo and Geohas’ opinions was harmless. See Molina, 
    674 F.3d at 1115
    (error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability
    determination”).
    The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for assigning little weight
    to the controverted opinions of Drs. Roy and Lucas as inconsistent with their own
    treatment notes and with the medical evidence and as based on Jones’ subjective
    complaints. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; Tonapetyan, 
    242 F.3d at 1149
    ; Molina,
    
    674 F.3d at 1111
     (this court “must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported
    by inferences reasonably drawn from the record”). The ALJ further provided
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    specific and legitimate reasons for assigning little weight to Dr. Roy’s opinion
    because he did not have a long-term treating relationship with Jones, he was a
    primary care physician rather than a specialist, and provided little to no explanation
    for his opinion. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; Tonapetyan, 
    242 F.3d at 1149
    .
    The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for assigning little weight
    to Dr. Verma’s controverted opinion as based on Jones’ subjective reports, as not
    supported by the evidence, and for not citing what supported his conclusions. See
    Molina, 
    674 F.3d at 1111
     (this court “must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are
    supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record”); Batson, 359 F.3d at
    1195; Tonapetyan, 
    242 F.3d at 1149
    .
    The ALJ provided germane reasons for assigning little weight to physician
    assistant John Primak’s controverted opinion as inconsistent with his treatment
    records, based on Jones’ subjective complaints, and highly conclusory in a number
    of places. See Molina, 
    674 F.3d at 1111
     (an ALJ may discount the opinion of an
    “other source” if the ALJ provides germane reasons for doing so).
    AFFIRMED.
    4