United States v. Ignacio Reyes-Yanez ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 6 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-50076
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:16-cr-01283-MMA-3
v.
IGNACIO REYES-YANEZ, AKA Freddy, MEMORANDUM*
AKA Nacho, AKA Jose Juan Valles,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Michael M. Anello, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 4, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: KLEINFELD and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and PAULEY,*** District
Judge.
Ignacio Reyes-Yanez appeals his jury-trial conviction for conspiracy to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable William H. Pauley III, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The government did not mischaracterize the presumption of innocence or
its burden of proof at trial, and the district court did not err in overruling defense
counsel’s corresponding objection and request for a curative instruction. The
government’s statement that “the trial is about whether [the defendant]’s guilty or
not” did not diminish the government’s burden of proof, where government
counsel, defense counsel, and the jury instructions alike repeatedly told the jury
that the government had the burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The government was not required to repeat this standard every time it referenced
the jury’s task. Nor was the government’s statement inaccurate. See Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1970) (explaining that the criminal jury trial “rel[ies]
on a body of one’s peers to determine guilt or innocence”).
The government also did not misstate the law when it explained that no
special presumption attaches to a criminal defendant’s testimony, and the
testimony of a defendant should be judged just like that of any other witness. The
overarching presumption of innocence in criminal cases does not dictate that
testifying criminal defendants enjoy any greater presumption of credibility than
other witnesses. In addition, Reyes-Yanez construes too broadly the government’s
statement of law; the government did not imply that the presumption of innocence
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falls away if a criminal defendant elects to testify on his own behalf. And again,
the court and counsel repeatedly instructed the jury that the defendant was to be
presumed innocent.
2. The district court did not plainly err in permitting the government to ask
the defendant during cross-examination whether he was lying. Although a witness
may not be asked to opine on the credibility of another witness, United States v.
Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2002), there is no prohibition on
questioning a witness about his own truthfulness.
AFFIRMED.
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