Linda Varga v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAR 6 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LINDA MORAVEC VARGA, on behalf of               No.    18-56572
    herself and all others similarly situated,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            2:16-cv-09650-DMG-KS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., a National
    Association; DOES, 2-10, inclusive,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    WELLS FARGO AND COMPANY, a
    Delaware corporation,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 3, 2020**
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: HURWITZ and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,*** District
    Judge.
    Linda Varga obtained a mortgage loan from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. that
    required fixed monthly payments for ten years, after which the interest rate would
    become adjustable. Varga was to receive notice of any adjustments in a prescribed
    form that included certain title-and-telephone-number information for a point of
    contact at the lender. After ten years, Varga received notices from Wells Fargo
    adjusting her interest rate substantially downward. In 2015, two years after her
    rate became adjustable, Varga received a notice that her rate would increase; it
    would, however, still be below the level set for the first ten years of the loan.
    Varga refinanced with another lender and then filed this action, alleging that
    Wells Fargo’s rate adjustment notices omitted the title-and-telephone-number
    information required by the loan agreement, and asserting contract and tort claims.
    The district court dismissed her Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a
    claim.
    We review de novo and may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
    See Tritz v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    721 F.3d 1133
    , 1136 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.
    1. The district court did not err in dismissing Varga’s contract claims.
    ***
    The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
    the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    2
    Even assuming that Wells Fargo could not adjust the mortgage rate without
    providing a precisely conforming notice, Varga did not plausibly allege that she
    had suffered damages or other injury. Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 
    250 P.3d 1115
    , 1121 (Cal. 2011) (damage to the plaintiff is an element of a breach of
    contract claim); Cochran v. Cochran, 
    66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 337
    , 342 n.6 (Ct. App.
    1997) (“Actual damage as opposed to mere nominal damage is [an] essential
    element of a cause of action for breach of contract.”); Yari v. Producers Guild of
    Am., Inc., 
    73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803
    , 811 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a breach of
    implied contract claim includes the same elements as a breach of contract claim).
    Because the notices informed her of monthly payment amounts that were
    substantially lower than the rates she paid under her fixed-rate mortgage, Varga
    was better off if the notices she received were operative than if they were invalid.
    Varga’s conclusory assertion that she was “deprived of the contractual and
    consumer protections and benefits” of the notice provision is insufficient to
    plausibly allege any harm attributable to the noncompliant notice. Ashcroft v.
    Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678-79 (2009). Varga expressly declined to amend her
    complaint to allege any injury from fees she paid to refinance her mortgage. See
    Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 
    356 F.3d 1058
    , 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
    2. For similar reasons, the district court did not err in dismissing Varga’s
    tort claims, which also require a plausible allegation of harm, see Lazar v. Superior
    3
    Ct., 
    909 P.2d 981
    , 984-85 (Cal. 1996) (fraud); Cadlo v. Owens-Illinois, 
    23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1
    , 5 (Ct. App. 2004) (negligent misrepresentation); 
    18 U.S.C. § 1964
    (c)
    (RICO); In re Tobacco II Cases, 
    207 P.3d 20
    , 31 (Cal. 2009) (California Unfair
    Competition Law); 
    Cal. Penal Code § 496
    (c) (treble damages for injury from
    receipt of stolen property), or that the defendant wrongfully or under false
    pretenses deprived her of property, 
    Cal. Penal Code § 518
    (a) (extortion); 
    18 U.S.C. § 1341
     (mail fraud).
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-56572

Filed Date: 3/6/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/6/2020