John Davis v. Goodyear Police Department ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAR 6 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOHN LEO DAVIS,                                 No. 19-15857
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:18-cv-02603-SMB-
    CDB
    v.
    GOODYEAR POLICE DEPARTMENT, et                  MEMORANDUM*
    al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 3, 2020**
    Before:      MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
    Arizona state pretrial detainee John Leo Davis appeals pro se from the
    district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims
    arising out of his arrest in 2015. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    We review de novo. Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 
    535 F.3d 1044
    ,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    1047 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissal on the basis of the statute of limitations); Resnick
    v. Hayes, 
    213 F.3d 443
    , 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).
    We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Davis’s action as time-barred because
    Davis filed this action more than two years after his federal claims accrued, and
    more than one year after his state law claims accrued. See 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542
     (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821
     (one-year statute of limitations for actions against a public entity or
    public employee); Soto v. Sweetman, 
    882 F.3d 865
    , 870-71 (9th Cir. 2018) (state
    tolling and statute of limitations for personal injury claims apply to § 1983 action,
    and federal law governs when claim accrues, which is when a plaintiff knows or
    should know of the injury that forms the basis for his cause of action); see also
    Doe v. Roe, 
    955 P.2d 951
    , 964 (Ariz. 1998) (unsound mind equitable tolling may
    not be established by “conclusory averments such as assertions that one was unable
    to manage daily affairs or understand legal rights and liabilities” but rather requires
    plaintiff to set forth “specific facts”).
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                   19-15857