Syed Ali v. Apple, Inc. ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAR 9 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SYED NAZIM ALI,                                 No. 18-17264
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:18-cv-03945-RS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    APPLE, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 3, 2020**
    Before:      MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
    Syed Nazim Ali appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    his employment action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Ali’s discrimination and retaliation
    claims under Title VII and the California Fair Employment Housing Act (“FEHA”)
    because Ali failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft
    v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 679 (2009) (a plaintiff fails to show he is entitled to relief if
    the complaint’s factual allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the
    mere possibility of [the alleged] misconduct”); Freitag v. Ayers, 
    468 F.3d 528
    , 541
    (9th Cir. 2006) (elements of a Title VII retaliation claim); Costa v. Desert Palace,
    Inc., 
    299 F.3d 838
    , 847-48 (9th Cir. 2002) (the protected characteristic must be a
    motivating factor for the employment decision for a Title VII discrimination
    claim); Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 
    294 P.3d 49
    , 66 (Cal. 2013) (the protected
    characteristic must be a substantial motivating factor for the employment decision
    for a FEHA discrimination claim); Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 
    81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406
    , 428 (Ct. App. 2008) (elements of a FEHA retaliation claim).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ali leave to file a
    second amended complaint because leave to amend would have been futile. See
    Serra v. Lappin, 
    600 F.3d 1191
    , 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of
    review and factors for determining whether to grant leave to amend); Metzler Inv.
    GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 
    540 F.3d 1049
    , 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
    district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where
    2                                     18-17264
    plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted)).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Ali’s state law
    claims rather than remanding his state law claims to state court. See Satey v.
    JPMorgan Chase & Co., 
    521 F.3d 1087
    , 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth
    standard of review and explaining that the district court has discretion to retain
    supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims even if the federal law claims are
    dismissed).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                       18-17264