Carl Ball Caples v. City of Phoenix ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 9 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARL VINCENT BALL CAPLES, No. 18-16410
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:14-cv-02619-SRB
v.
CITY OF PHOENIX, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 5, 2020**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: HAWKINS, OWENS, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Carl Caples appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
the City of Phoenix (“the City”) on statute of limitations grounds in Caples’
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging municipal liability under Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). We review de novo a district court’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
decision to grant summary judgment. Folkens v. Wyland Worldwide, LLC, 882
F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2018). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not
recount them here. We affirm.
Caples argues that his claim accrued when it became clear that the harm he
suffered was the consequence of a municipal policy or custom. See Monell, 436
U.S. at 694. This court has not yet considered the delayed accrual theory proposed
by Caples. However, we need not do so in this case because Caples’ claim was
untimely even under delayed accrual.
Caples alleges that he learned his arrest was the result of an unlawful policy
or custom in October 2014, when the City released a report providing what Caples
describes as the “essential factual basis” for his Monell claim. Specifically, the
report allegedly proved that Caples was just one of several people wrongly accused
of arson by the Phoenix Fire Department (“PFD”), and that the PFD’s accelerant-
detecting dog program was so flawed that the PFD had to “entirely revamp” the
program.
However, the record shows that Caples’ criminal defense lawyer learned
those same allegedly essential facts while litigating Caples’ criminal case in 2010.
It is undisputed that by September 2010 at the latest, Caples’ lawyer knew the
essential facts that allegedly prove the existence of an unlawful municipal policy or
custom. Caples is therefore considered to have received notice of those facts by
2 18-16410
September 2010. See Ringgold Corp. v. Worrall, 880 F.2d 1138, 1141–42 (9th
Cir. 1989). He did not file his complaint until 2014. The complaint was untimely
under Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 12-542; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (holding that the
timeliness of § 1983 claims is governed by the forum state’s personal injury statute
of limitations).
AFFIRMED.
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