Mario Jaimes-Cardenas v. William Barr ( 2020 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MARIO ERNESTO JAIMES-CARDENAS,                     No. 19-71849
    Petitioner,
    Agency No.
    v.                            A089-840-090
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.                   OPINION
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted July 7, 2020
    Seattle, Washington
    Filed September 1, 2020
    Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, D. Michael Fisher, * and
    Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Hawkins
    *
    The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2                  JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR
    SUMMARY **
    Immigration
    Denying Mario Ernesto Jaimes-Cardenas’s petition for
    review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    concluding that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal
    under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), which provides a special rule
    for victims of domestic violence (the “Special Rule”), the
    panel held that the domestic violence waiver established
    under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(7), and made applicable to
    cancellation of removal by 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(5), is limited
    to crimes of domestic violence and stalking, and therefore
    does not cover Jaimes-Cardenas’s drug conviction.
    The Special Rule for cancellation of removal was
    enacted as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
    (“VAWA”). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv), an
    applicant for such relief must demonstrate that he or she is
    not inadmissible or deportable on certain grounds, subject to
    § 1229b(b)(5). Section 1229b(b)(5), in turn, provides that
    “the authority provided under section 1227(a)(7) of this title
    may apply under paragraphs (1)(B), (1)(C) and (2)(A)(iv) [of
    § 1229b(b)] in a cancellation of removal and adjustment of
    status proceeding.” Section 1227(a)(7), in turn, establishes
    a waiver that is limited to crimes of domestic violence and
    stalking or violations of a domestic violence protective
    order.
    An immigration judge denied Jaimes-Cardenas’s
    application for Special Rule cancellation of removal, finding
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR                     3
    first that he was inadmissible for having been convicted of a
    controlled substance offense. The IJ then considered
    whether, despite his conviction, he was potentially eligible
    for relief with a § 1227(a)(7) waiver. However, the IJ
    concluded that § 1227(a)(7) could not waive Jaimes-
    Cardenas’s controlled substance offense. The BIA adopted
    and affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief.
    Before this court, Jaimes-Cardenas conceded that
    § 1227(a)(7) is limited to offenses for domestic violence and
    stalking and violations of a protective order, but argued that
    § 1229b(b)(5) is an independent and broader domestic
    violence waiver that covers all offenses listed in (1)(B),
    (1)(C), and (2)(A)(iv) of § 1229b(b), which would include
    his controlled substance conviction.
    The panel held that the plain meaning of § 1229b(b)(5)
    allows the waiver of § 1227(a)(7) to apply in Special Rule
    cancellation proceedings only to the extent of the authority
    granted in § 1227(a)(7).        The panel explained that
    § 1229b(b)(5) imports § 1227(a)(7)’s textual limitations and
    that nothing in the text, statutory context, or statutory
    purpose of VAWA otherwise allowed the panel to find that
    § 1229b(b)(5) establishes a freestanding domestic violence
    waiver. The panel also noted that its approach comported
    with that of the Fifth Circuit, the only other circuit that
    appears to have dealt with the issue.
    Because the plain meaning of § 1229b(b)(5) supports the
    agency’s conclusion that the applicable domestic violence
    waiver does not cover Jaimes-Cardenas’s drug conviction,
    the panel concluded that he was ineligible for Special Rule
    cancellation of removal.
    4               JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR
    COUNSEL
    Jessica E. Rehms (argued), Northwest Immigrant Rights
    Project, Tacoma, Washington; Aaron Korthuis, Northwest
    Immigrant Rights Project, Seattle, Washington; for
    Petitioner.
    Anna Juarez (argued), Senior Litigation Counsel; Melissa
    Neiman-Kelting, Assistant Director; Joseph H. Hunt,
    Assistant Attorney General; Office of Immigration
    Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of
    Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
    OPINION
    HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:
    Mario Ernesto Jaimes-Cardenas seeks review of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming the
    denial of his application for relief pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229b(b)(2), which concerns a special rule for cancellation
    of removal and adjustment of status for victims of domestic
    violence (the “Special Rule”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
    found Jaimes-Cardenas ineligible for cancellation of
    removal as a battered spouse due to a prior drug conviction.
    Although Jaimes-Cardenas claimed that a domestic violence
    waiver under the Special Rule waived that ineligibility
    ground, the agency disagreed. The agency concluded that
    the domestic violence waiver established by 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(7) is limited to crimes of domestic violence and
    stalking, and that the Special Rule’s waiver provision
    incorporates these textual limitations. Jaimes-Cardenas
    argues that the agency erred because, in his view, the Special
    Rule has a freestanding and broader domestic violence
    JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR                      5
    waiver. We conclude that the plain language of the relevant
    statutory provisions establishes that the domestic violence
    waiver under the Special Rule only incorporates the
    authority provided under § 1227(a)(7), which concededly
    does not cover Jaimes-Cardenas’s drug conviction. Thus, he
    is ineligible for special cancellation of removal as a domestic
    violence victim. We therefore deny his petition for review. 1
    I.
    Jaimes-Cardenas is a native and citizen of Mexico. He
    first entered the United States without inspection in or
    around 2008, and shortly thereafter met U.S. citizen Flora
    Rico. They coupled, eventually getting married and starting
    a family.         Flora, however, was addicted to
    methamphetamines, which Jaimes-Cardenas urged her to
    stop using. She responded with violence and abuse,
    threatening to call Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    (“ICE”) on him. One incident led to Jaimes-Cardenas’s
    arrest, after which he was transferred to ICE custody and
    voluntarily returned to Mexico. Less than a year later, he
    returned to the U.S. with the help of Flora, who was then
    pregnant with their first child.
    After the child was born, Flora became increasingly
    abusive and controlling over Jaimes-Cardenas’s life. He
    suffered physical, emotional, and verbal abuse from her, but
    stayed in the relationship because of his children and love
    for Flora. Eventually, matters took a turn for the worse.
    Flora used more drugs and started selling drugs to support
    her habit. She left Jaimes-Cardenas and their children, only
    initiating contact when she needed money or was in trouble.
    1
    We deny as moot Jaimes-Cardenas’s motion to stay removal
    proceedings (ECF Docs. 1 and 9).
    6                  JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR
    After one particularly bad incident, the local Department of
    Human Services intervened, which resulted in Jaimes-
    Cardenas losing custody of their six children (four
    biological) placed in foster care. Flora later was arrested and
    convicted of possession of methamphetamine.
    Jaimes-Cardenas then attempted to cut ties with Flora,
    but she showed up at his apartment to convince him to get
    back together with her. At the time, there was an active
    arrest warrant against her for failure to comply with the
    terms of her sentence. Jaimes-Cardenas had to go to work
    and left the apartment. Flora stayed behind, bringing in
    methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Later that day,
    Jaimes-Cardenas’s landlord informed him that police were
    looking for him because they found methamphetamine in his
    apartment.       Despite Flora’s statement that the
    methamphetamine was hers, police arrested Jaimes-
    Cardenas and charged him with possession, manufacture,
    and delivery of methamphetamine, as well as hindering
    prosecution for his failure to report Flora in light of her
    active arrest warrant. After his arrest, Jaimes-Cardenas’s
    counsel informed him that “he would likely face more
    detention by ICE and removal if he decided to fight the
    case.” He therefore pleaded to one count of possession of
    methamphetamine. 2
    The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) then
    initiated removal proceedings against Jaimes-Cardenas.
    DHS charged him as inadmissible for: (1) entering without
    2
    Jaimes-Cardenas claims that his counsel did not inform him that
    pleading guilty could make him “ineligible for any type of immigration
    relief” and is currently seeking post-conviction relief in Oregon state
    court. During oral argument, counsel stated that Jaimes-Cardenas’s
    petition was on appeal there.
    JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR                     7
    inspection under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(6)(A)(i); and (2) having
    been convicted of a law or regulation related to a controlled
    substance offense under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
    Jaimes-Cardenas admitted the allegations and conceded
    removability, but he applied for relief in the form of special
    cancellation of removal for victims of domestic violence
    under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2).
    The IJ denied Jaimes-Cardenas’s application for relief,
    finding first that he was inadmissible under
    § 1182(a)(2)(a)(i)(II) as an “alien convicted of . . . a
    violation of . . . any law . . . relating to a controlled
    substance.” The IJ then considered Jaimes-Cardenas’s
    argument that “despite his conviction, he is eligible or
    potentially eligible because [of] the provisions in
    [§ 1229b(b)(5)].” The IJ determined that § 1229b(b)(5)
    authorizes the domestic violence waiver of § 1227(a)(7) to
    apply in certain cancellation of removal or adjustment of
    status proceedings. In looking at § 1227(a)(7)’s text, the IJ
    found that “the authority provided for the waiver under
    Section [1227](a)(7), even if granted, does not waive
    [Jaimes-Cardenas’s] [§ 1182](a)(2) controlled substance
    offense.” Specifically, § 1227(a)(7)’s waiver only applies to
    crimes of domestic violence and stalking or violations of a
    domestic violence protective order, as defined in
    § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) and (ii). Because Jaimes-Cardenas’s
    methamphetamine conviction was “not a domestic violence
    conviction, nor a stalking conviction, nor a violation of a
    protective order,” the IJ deemed him ineligible for special
    cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv).
    The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief,
    concluding “the plain language of the pertinent statutory
    sections indicate that [Jaimes-Cardenas’s] controlled
    substance conviction makes him ineligible for both special
    8               JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR
    rule cancellation of removal under section [1229b](b)(2) of
    the Act, and a waiver under sections [1229b](b)(5) and
    [1227](a)(7).” Jaimes-Cardenas timely petitioned for our
    review.
    II.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a). “Where,
    as here, the BIA adopts the [IJ’s] decision and also adds its
    own reasons, [the panel] review[s] both decisions.” Nuru v.
    Gonzales, 
    404 F.3d 1207
    , 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). The BIA’s
    interpretation of purely legal questions is reviewed de novo.
    
    Id.
    III.
    Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
    DHS may initiate removal proceedings against any alien
    deemed “inadmissib[le]” under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a) or
    “deportab[le]” under § 1227(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(2).
    In certain circumstances, an alien may seek to “cancel” his
    removal and adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent
    resident. This case concerns the INA’s “[s]pecial rule for
    battered spouse[s] or child[ren],” § 1229b(b)(2)(A), enacted
    as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
    (“VAWA”). More specifically, we must consider the
    interplay between three provisions: § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv),
    § 1229b(b)(5), and § 1227(a)(7)(A) to determine the scope
    of the domestic violence waiver applicable to cancellation of
    removal and adjustment of status proceeding under the
    Special Rule.
    First, the Special Rule requires that an alien seeking
    cancellation of removal as a battered spouse or child
    demonstrate that:
    JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR                       9
    the alien is not inadmissible under paragraph
    (2) or (3) of section 1182(a) of this title, is
    not deportable under paragraphs (1)(G) or
    (2) through (4) of section 1227(a) of this title,
    subject to paragraph (5), and has not been
    convicted of an aggravated felony.
    § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv) (emphasis added).
    Next, paragraph (5) of the Special Rule, titled
    “Application of domestic violence waiver authority,”
    provides that:
    The authority provided under section
    1227(a)(7) of this title may apply under
    paragraphs (1)(B), (1)(C), and (2)(A)(iv) in a
    cancellation of removal and adjustment of
    status proceeding.
    § 1229b(b)(5) (emphasis added).
    Last, the waiver codified at § 1227(a)(7) provides that:
    The Attorney General is not limited by the
    criminal court record and may waive the
    application of paragraph (2)(E)(i) (with
    respect to crimes of domestic violence and
    crimes of stalking) and (ii) in the case of an
    alien who has been battered or subjected to
    extreme cruelty and who is not and was not
    the primary perpetrator of violence in the
    relationship–
    (i) upon a determination that–
    10              JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR
    (I) the alien was acting is [sic] self-
    defense;
    (II) the alien was found to have
    violated a protection order intended to
    protect the alien; or
    (III) the alien committed, was
    arrested for, was convicted of, or pled
    guilty to committing a crime–
    (aa) that did not result in serious
    bodily injury; and
    (bb) where there was a connection
    between the crime and the alien's
    having been battered or subjected
    to extreme cruelty.
    § 1227(a)(7)(A) (emphasis added).
    The parties dispute whether § 1229b(b)(5) is a
    freestanding and broader domestic violence waiver or
    instead incorporates the limitations of § 1227. The agency
    contends that § 1229b(b)(5) incorporates the limitations of
    § 1227(a)(7), which limit the waiver to offenses for domestic
    violence and stalking under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) and
    violations of a protective order under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii),
    which would exclude Jaimes-Cardenas’s conviction.
    Jaimes-Cardenas concedes that § 1227(a)(7) is limited in
    this manner. However, he argues that § 1229b(b)(5) is an
    independent and broader domestic violence waiver that
    covers all the offenses covered by paragraphs (1)(B), (1)(C),
    and (2)(A)(iv) of § 1229b(b), which would include his
    controlled substances conviction.
    JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR                     11
    Because this appeal boils down to a question of statutory
    interpretation, we start with the text. Bottinelli v. Salazar,
    
    929 F.3d 1196
    , 1199 (9th Cir. 2019). “Whether the statutory
    text has a plain and unambiguous meaning depends on the
    language itself, the specific context in which that language
    is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”
    
    Id.
     (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the plain
    language of § 1229b(b)(5) supports the agency’s
    interpretation.
    Section 1229b(b)(5)’s title, “Application of domestic
    violence waiver authority,” demonstrates its purpose is to
    simply allow the domestic violence waiver codified at
    § 1227(a)(7) to apply in proceedings under § 1229b(b). This
    purpose is borne out by the text of § 1229b(b)(5), which
    says, “The authority provided under section 1227(a)(7) of
    this title may apply under paragraphs (1)(B), (1)(C), and
    (2)(A)(iv) in a cancellation of removal and adjustment of
    status proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(5) (emphasis
    added).
    Read plainly, § 1229b(b)(5) incorporates only the
    authority provided in § 1227(a)(7)’s waiver of deportability.
    There is no indication that it either adds to or expands that
    authority. Section 1229b(b)(5) imports § 1227(a)(7)’s
    textual limitations, starting with the offenses to which
    § 1227(a)(7) is limited (domestic violence and stalking
    under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) and violations of protective orders
    under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)), and then the determinations that
    must be made under § 1227(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) through (III) (the
    alien acted in self-defense, the alien violated a protective
    order intended to protect the alien, or the crime did not result
    in serious bodily injury and was connected to the alien’s
    abuse). In other words, § 1227(a)(7)’s textual limitations do
    not disappear when the waiver is applied to cancellation of
    12                  JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR
    removal under § 1229b(b)(5). They remain, and thus
    circumscribe the waiver’s application to cancellation of
    removal and adjustment of status proceedings under the
    Special Rule.
    We are unpersuaded by the arguments that Jaimes-
    Cardenas advances to support his expansive reading of
    § 1229b(b)(5).       Jaimes-Cardenas’s arguments omit
    § 1229b(b)(5)’s language that expressly incorporates the
    “authority provided under § 1227(a)(7).” We are not free to
    do so. See Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Sch. v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Educ., 
    464 F.3d 1003
    , 1007 (9th Cir. 2006). Nothing in the
    text, statutory context, or statutory purpose of VAWA
    otherwise allows us to find that § 1229b(b)(5) establishes a
    freestanding domestic violence waiver that may be applied
    differently than the textual limitations of § 1227(a)(7).
    Therefore, we hold the plain meaning of § 1229b(b)(5)
    allows the waiver of § 1227(a)(7) to apply in proceedings
    under § 1229b(b)(5) only to the extent of the authority
    granted in § 1227(a)(7). It does not create a separate waiver
    that would apply more broadly to all the offenses that “fall
    under” § 1229b(b)(1)(B), (1)(C), and (2)(A)(iv) as Jaimes-
    Cardenas suggests. The domestic violence waiver that
    applies to the Special Rule proceedings thus does not cover
    his methamphetamine possession conviction. 3
    Our approach here comports with the Fifth Circuit’s in
    Rodriguez-Benitez v. Holder, 
    763 F.3d 404
     (5th Cir. 2014),
    the only other circuit who appears to have dealt with this
    issue. There, the Fifth Circuit found “the clear language” of
    3
    We express no opinion on the viability of Jaimes-Cardenas’s
    eligibility for special cancellation of removal should his collateral attack
    on his drug conviction under Kentucky v. Padilla, 
    559 U.S. 356
     (2010),
    prove fruitful.
    JAIMES-CARDENAS V. BARR                     13
    § 1229b(b)(5) does not permit a judge to waive grounds of
    inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(2) “for offenses other than
    those related to domestic violence.” Id. at 407. Looking to
    § 1229b(b)(5)’s title and text, as well as the language of
    § 1227(a)(7), the Fifth Circuit found “no support for an
    argument that [it] should pull from [§ 1227(a)(7)] a general
    authority to waive all crimes instead of the specific authority
    described therein.” Id. at 408. That conclusion comports
    with our statutory analysis.
    IV.
    The plain meaning of § 1229b(b)(5) supports the
    agency’s conclusion that the applicable domestic violence
    waiver does not cover Jaimes-Cardenas’s drug possession
    conviction.     He was therefore ineligible for special
    cancellation of removal. His petition for review is denied.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-71849

Filed Date: 9/1/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/1/2020