Rajinder Malhotra v. Copa De Ora Realty, LLC ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    DEC 14 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RAJINDER KUMAR MALHOTRA, an                      No.   14-56241
    individual and VEENA MALHOTRA, an
    individual,                                      D.C. No.
    2:13-cv-04146-MWF-VBK
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    COPA DE ORA REALTY, LLC, a
    California limited liability company,
    Defendant,
    and
    RAKESH “ROCKY” MALHOTRA, an
    individual,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    RAJINDER KUMAR MALHOTRA, an                      No.   15-56654
    individual and VEENA MALHOTRA, an
    individual,                                      D.C. No.
    2:13-cv-04146-MWF-VBK
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    COPA DE ORA REALTY, LLC, a
    California limited liability company and
    RAKESH MALHOTRA, an individual,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 9, 2016**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: CALLAHAN, BEA, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant Rakesh Malhotra appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
    to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs Rajinder and Veena Malhotra appeal the district
    court’s entry of partial summary judgment for defendants and the district court’s
    declination of supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims following
    summary judgment. We have jurisdiction over these appeals under 
    9 U.S.C. § 16
    (a)(1) and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We affirm in part and dismiss in part.1
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    1
    We decline Rajinder and Veena’s invitation to dismiss Rakesh’s appeal due
    to technical violations of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and our Circuit
    Rules. See generally In re O’Brien, 
    312 F.3d 1135
     (9th Cir. 2002). Any violations
    were not sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to preclude effective appellate
    review.
    2
    The district court did not err in denying the motion to compel arbitration of
    Rajinder’s claims against Rakesh because by its terms, the contract containing the
    arbitration agreement requires arbitration only of disputes “arising from or
    connected with” that contract, and Rajinder’s claims do not have a “significant
    relationship to the contract” nor have “their origin or genesis in the contract.”
    Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 
    175 F.3d 716
    , 721 (9th Cir. 1999). The claims
    asserted do not require an interpretation of the contract’s terms, do not arise from a
    failure to perform under the contract, and do not relate to conduct that could not
    have occurred but for the contract. For several of the claims, the only connection
    to the contract is that Rajinder’s personal funds are traceable to a corporate
    restructuring of which the contract was a part. The allegations disclose that the
    contract’s existence was a mere background fact against which the conduct at issue
    here occurred; the relationship of the conduct to the contract is incidental rather
    than direct, and accordingly no “significant relationship” exists.2 
    Id.
    The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Rakesh on
    Rajinder and Veena’s claim under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1962
    (c). Even if Rajinder and
    Veena proved each of the ten predicate acts they allege occurred between April
    2
    Because no claim asserted is arbitrable under the contract, we need not
    reach or decide whether Veena is equitably estopped from avoiding the arbitration
    provision.
    3
    2011 and August 2012, Rakesh would be “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At most, the evidence in the summary judgment record
    shows that Rakesh and Copa de Ora Realty, LLC (CDO) executed a single scheme
    with all predicate acts occurring in a short time frame. The scheme had “the
    singular purpose” of fraudulently inducing Rajinder to transfer funds to CDO, cf.
    Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 
    978 F.2d 1529
    , 1535 (9th Cir. 1992), and the scheme
    had no victims other than Rajinder and Veena, cf. Medallion Television Enters.,
    Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 
    833 F.2d 1360
    , 1363–64 (9th Cir. 1987). Because
    Rakesh’s “collective conduct is in a sense a single episode,” Sever, 
    978 F.2d at 1535
    , the fraud alleged is not the type of “long-term criminal conduct” with which
    “Congress was concerned in RICO,” H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell. Tel. Co., 
    492 U.S. 229
    ,
    242 (1989). For these reasons, even when viewed in the light most favorable to
    Rajinder and Veena, the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a
    pattern of racketeering activity. See Sever, 
    978 F.2d at
    1535–36; Medallion
    Television Enters., 833 F.2d at 1363–65.
    Because the § 1962(c) claim was the only remaining basis for original
    federal jurisdiction, the district court did not abuse its broad discretion by
    dismissing Rajinder and Veena’s state law claims after entering summary judgment
    for Rakesh on the § 1962(c) claim. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c)(3); Schultz v. Sundberg,
    4
    
    759 F.2d 714
    , 718 (9th Cir. 1985). The district court properly considered factors
    of judicial economy, convenience, and comity and did not err by concluding that
    “the balance of factors . . . point[ed] toward declining to exercise jurisdiction.”
    Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 
    484 U.S. 343
    , 350 n.7 (1988).
    In light of these holdings, we dismiss as moot the appeal relating to CDO’s
    waiver of its right to compel arbitration. Finally, because the district court’s denial
    of Rakesh’s motion to stay litigation pending his appeal of the motion to compel
    arbitration is not an appealable order, Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. L.R. Ranch
    Co., 
    926 F.2d 859
    , 862 (9th Cir. 1991), this appeal is dismissed.
    All pending motions are DENIED.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART
    5