Capeem v. Tom Torlakson ( 2020 )


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  •                   FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CALIFORNIA PARENTS FOR THE                No. 19-15607
    EQUALIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL
    MATERIALS; ARVIND RAGHAVAN,                  D.C. No.
    individually and as parent and next       3:17-cv-00635-
    friend of M.R. and N.R.;                       CRB
    VISHNUKUMAR THUMATI,
    individually and as parent and next
    friend of P.T. and N.T.; SHAILESH           OPINION
    SHILWANT, individually and as
    parent and next friend of P.S. and
    P.S.S.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    TOM TORLAKSON, in his official
    capacity as State Superintendent of
    Public Instruction and Director of
    Education for the California
    Department of Education; TOM
    ADAMS, in his official capacity as
    Deputy Superintendent of the
    Instruction and Learning Support
    Branch of the California Department
    of Education; STEPHANIE GREGSON,
    in her official capacity as Director of
    the Curriculum Frameworks and
    Instructional Resources Division of
    the California Department of
    2              CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    Education; MICHAEL KIRST; ILENE
    STRAUS; SUE BURR; BRUCE
    HOLADAY; FELIZA I. ORTIZ-LICON;
    PATRICIA ANN RUCKER; NICOLASA
    SANDOVAL; TING L. SUN; TRISH
    BOYD WILLIAMS, each in their
    official capacity as a member of the
    California State Board of Education;
    MYONG LEIGH, in his official
    capacity as Interim Superintendent
    of the San Francisco Unified School
    District; SHAMANN WALTON;
    HYDRA MENDOZA-MCDONNELL;
    STEVON COOK; MATT HANEY;
    EMILY M. MURASE; RACHEL
    NORTON; MARK SANCHEZ, each in
    their official capacity as a member
    of the San Francisco Unified School
    District; RICK SCHMITT, in his
    official capacity as Superintendent
    of the San Ramon Valley Unified
    School District; MARK JEWETT; KEN
    MINTZ; RACHEL HURD; DENISE
    JENNISON; GREG MARVEL, each in
    their official capacity as a member
    of the San Ramon Valley Unified
    School District Board of Education;
    WENDY GUDALEWICZ, in her official
    capacity as Superintendent of the
    Cupertino Union School District;
    ANJALI KAUSAR; LIANG CHAO;
    KRISTEN LYN; SOMA MCCANDLESS;
    PHYLLIS VOGEL, each in their
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                    3
    official capacity as a member of the
    Cupertino Union School District
    Board of Education; CHERYL
    JORDAN, in her official capacity as
    Superintendent of the Milpitas
    Unified School District; DANIEL
    BOBAY; DANNY LAU; CHRIS
    NORWOOD; HON LIEN; ROBERT
    JUNG, each in their official capacity
    as a member of the Milpitas Unified
    School District Board of Education,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
    CALIFORNIA,
    Intervenor.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 14, 2020
    San Francisco, California
    Filed September 3, 2020
    Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Mary M.
    Schroeder and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Schroeder;
    Concurrence by Judge Bress
    4                    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    SUMMARY*
    Civil Rights
    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all but
    one of plaintiffs’ claims and its summary judgment in favor
    of defendants on the remaining claim in an action brought by
    parents of Hindu children in the California public schools
    who alleged discrimination against the Hindu religion in the
    content of the History-Social Science Standards and
    Framework for sixth and seventh graders.
    The complaint focused on a handful of provisions in the
    1998 Standards and the 2016 Framework and alleged these
    curriculum materials carried a hostile and denigrating
    message about the origins of Hinduism when compared with
    similar provisions relating to other religions of the world.
    Addressing Appellants’ Equal Protection claims that the
    Standards and Framework discriminate against Hinduism, the
    panel held that the district court correctly characterized the
    challenge as an indirect attack on curricula. The panel
    determined that the allegations in the complaint contained no
    reference to State Board policy, nor did the allegations
    describe any materials used in the classroom from which such
    a policy could be inferred. Citing Monteiro v. Tempe Union
    School District, 
    158 F.3d 1022
     (9th Cir. 1998), the panel
    noted that, at least absent evidence of unlawful intentional
    discrimination, parents are not entitled to bring Equal
    Protection claims challenging curriculum content.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                          5
    Addressing Appellants’ claims under the Free Exercise
    clause of the First Amendment, the panel held that the
    complaint did not allege interference with Appellants’
    exercise of their religion under the Constitution as required
    for a viable Free Exercise claim under Trinity Lutheran
    Church v. Comer, 
    137 S. Ct. 2012
     (2017), and Espinoza v.
    Montana Department of Revenue, 
    140 S. Ct. 2246
    , 2252
    (2020). The panel held that offensive content that does not
    penalize, interfere with, or otherwise burden religious
    exercise does not violate Free Exercise rights.
    Addressing the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
    process claim, the panel held that, with respect to education,
    parents have the right to choose the educational forum, but
    not what takes place inside the school. Parents therefore do
    not have a due process right to interfere with the curriculum,
    discipline, hours of instruction, or the nature of any other
    curricular or extracurricular activities.
    Finally, addressing the First Amendment Establishment
    clause claims, the panel held that the district court did not
    abuse its discretion by excluding an expert report offered by
    plaintiffs to explain how, from the perspective of a person
    knowledgeable in the field of religious history, the Standards
    and Framework express a negative view of Hinduism. The
    panel held that it must evaluate the Standards and Framework
    from the perspective of an objective, reasonable observer, and
    not that of an academic who is an expert in the field. The
    panel concluded that the Standards and Framework did not
    call for the teaching of biblical events or figures as historical
    fact, thereby implicitly endorsing Judaism, Christianity, and
    Islam. The panel further concluded that none of Appellants’
    characterizations of the Hinduism materials as disparaging
    was supported by an objective reading of those materials.
    6                CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    Concurring, Judge Bress stated that the majority opinion
    correctly held that there was no basis in this record to
    conclude that the defendants discriminated against Hinduism.
    The majority also properly rejected the plaintiffs’
    Establishment Clause challenge. Judge Bress noted that some
    portions of the majority opinion discussing plaintiffs’
    Establishment Clause claim drew upon Ninth Circuit
    precedent that was based on Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
    403 U.S. 602
     (1971), and that the list of situations in which the
    Supreme Court has effectively repudiated the Lemon test,
    either by expressly declining to apply the test or simply
    ignoring it, has grown quite long. Judge Bress nevertheless
    stated that regardless, whether under a Lemon-based test or an
    Establishment Clause analysis more appropriately grounded
    in the history and traditions of this country, there was no
    establishment of religion here.
    COUNSEL
    Glenn Katon (argued), Katon Law, Oakland, California, for
    Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Thomas H. Prouty (argued), Deputy General Counsel; Todd
    M. Smith, Assistant General Counsel; Keith Yamanaka,
    General Counsel; California Department of Education,
    Sacramento, California; for Defendants-Appellees.
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                        7
    OPINION
    SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
    Parents of Hindu children in the California public schools
    filed suit against the State Department of Education and State
    Board of Education claiming discrimination against the
    Hindu religion in the content of the History-Social Science
    Standards and Framework for sixth and seventh graders.
    Appellants are individual parents and the organization
    California Parents for the Equalization of Educational
    Materials (CAPEEM). They alleged violations of several
    constitutional provisions including Due Process, Equal
    Protection, and the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses
    of the First Amendment.
    Their complaint focuses on a handful of provisions in the
    1998 Standards and the 2016 Framework and alleges these
    curriculum materials carry a hostile and denigrating message
    about the origins of Hinduism when compared with similar
    provisions relating to other religions of the world. Of
    particular concern is the passage in the Standards concerning
    the role of invaders, and their effect on the origins of
    Hinduism. Plaintiffs allege that this theory has been
    discredited and disparages their religion.
    The district court dismissed all but one of the claims and
    then granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the
    remaining Establishment clause claim, holding that the
    Standards and Framework do not communicate disapproval
    of Hinduism. The court also excluded an expert report
    offered by Appellants to explain how, from the perspective of
    a person knowledgeable in the field of religious history, the
    Standards and Framework express a negative view of
    8                 CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    Hinduism. The court ruled that the question was how
    curriculum materials would be understood by a reasonable
    observer, not how an expert would interpret them. We
    affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. California Content Standards, The Curriculum
    Framework, And Their Relevant Provisions
    The California State Board of Education (State Board)
    develops model curriculum outlines to provide standardized
    guidance to individual school districts. These outlines,
    known as Content Standards and Curriculum Frameworks,
    are used by individual school districts to design more tailored
    course curricula. See 
    Cal. Educ. Code § 60000
    (b). The State
    Board first issues Content Standards, which are broad
    guidelines for each major subject area, such as history and
    math. See 
    Cal. Educ. Code §§ 60602.5
    (a)(1), 60605, 60618.
    The State Board then issues Curriculum Frameworks which
    fill in more detail lacking in each of the Standards. See 
    Cal. Educ. Code §§ 60000
    , 60005, 60200(c). The local school
    districts in California decide the precise contours of what is
    taught in their public school classrooms, and can supplement
    the materials or omit content contained in them. See 
    Cal. Educ. Code § 60000
    (b).
    The State Board, in 1998, adopted the Content Standards
    for history and social science that Appellants challenge in this
    lawsuit. In just a few pages, the Content Standards outline
    the history of the world’s first major civilizations and
    religions, and invite sixth grade students to engage in critical
    analysis of the “geographic, political, economic, religious,
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                        9
    and social structures” of each civilization, including Ancient
    India.
    The State Board then adopted the Curriculum Framework
    for history and social science in 2016 after a lengthy
    comment process that solicited feedback from the public.
    Like the Content Standards, the Curriculum Framework calls
    for students to analyze ancient civilizations from a social
    science perspective, with materials to include, among other
    subject matter, “the birth and spread of religious and
    philosophical systems.”      The Curriculum Framework
    provides the additional detail and context lacking in the
    Content Standards.
    B. Plaintiffs And Challenged Provisions
    Appellants here are a non-profit organization, CAPEEM,
    and three parents on behalf of themselves and their children
    enrolled in California’s public school system. CAPEEM is a
    membership organization that exists to promote fair and
    accurate depictions of Hinduism in the public school system.
    This is not the first time that CAPEEM has challenged the
    constitutionality of information about Hinduism provided to
    public school students. In 2006, CAPEEM filed a lawsuit
    claiming that California’s recently adopted text books had
    content that was anti-Hindu, and that the use of such text
    books violated the Establishment clause. The district court in
    that case determined that the text books did not contain any
    information that disparaged Hinduism, and granted summary
    judgment to the state. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ.
    Materials v. Noonan, 
    600 F. Supp. 2d 1088
    , 1119 (E.D. Cal.
    2009). CAPEEM did not appeal. In this case, Appellants,
    instead of challenging text books, challenge certain aspects of
    10                CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    the descriptions of Hinduism in the 1998 Standards and 2016
    Framework.
    Appellants first assert that the Standards and Framework
    do not describe the divine origins of Hinduism or discuss the
    sacred texts of their religion, while, at the same time,
    describing the divine origins of the other major religions. As
    an example, they point to language in the Standards that
    describes Hinduism as consisting of “beliefs and practices,”
    and they point as well to a characterization of one of
    Hinduism’s sacred texts, the Bhagavad Gita, as an important
    piece of literature in Ancient India. Appellants additionally
    highlight a phrase in the Framework that describes Hinduism
    as a “culture that emerged as a belief system.” They argue
    that these are secular descriptions of Hinduism that are
    disparaging when read alongside the descriptions of other
    religions covered by the education materials.
    Appellants object as well to the Standards’ instruction
    directing the students to “[d]iscuss the significance of the
    Aryan Invasions.” Appellants assert that this instruction
    references a now-debunked theory that invaders from the
    north entered ancient India, leading to the creation of
    Hinduism.
    Also causing Appellants concern is the Framework’s
    description of the caste system in Ancient India; in particular,
    Appellants object to the description of caste as a religious
    belief. Appellants point to a passage in the Framework,
    which says that “Teachers should make clear to students that
    [caste] was a social and cultural structure as well as a
    religious belief.” Appellants argue that the association with
    the caste system singles out Hinduism for negative treatment
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                       11
    when compared with the other religions discussed in the
    Standards and Framework.
    These three objections form the basis of most of
    Appellants’ constitutional claims.
    C. The Complaint
    Appellants filed their complaint in 2017. It alleges that
    the content of the Standards and Framework, and the process
    leading up to the Framework’s adoption, violate several
    provisions of the constitution.
    The complaint includes two Equal Protection claims. The
    first is that the content of the Standards and Framework
    describes Hinduism in derogatory terms and from the
    perspective of a skeptic, whereas the same material describes
    other religions with respect. Appellants also allege that the
    Department of Education violated their Equal Protection
    rights when it refused to accept all of CAPEEM’s proposed
    edits to the Framework, while at the same time, accepting
    edits from other religious groups during the notice and
    comment process.
    With respect to the Free Exercise clause, the complaint
    alleges that the content of the challenged provisions of the
    Standards and Framework denigrates Hinduism and is
    therefore not neutral with respect to religion and violative of
    their rights to free exercise. As with their Equal Protection
    claims, Appellants also assert that occurrences in the process
    leading up to the Framework’s adoption violated their Free
    Exercise rights.
    12                CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    Bias against Hinduism in the content of the Standards and
    Framework is the basis for the alleged substantive due
    process violation as well. The complaint alleges that the
    Standards and Framework “indoctrinate children with beliefs
    biased deeply against Hinduism and in favor of the
    Abrahamic religions,” and thereby interfere with the liberty
    interests of the parent Appellants to control the upbringing
    and education of their children.
    Finally, the complaint contains two Establishment clause
    claims. It alleges that the content of the Standards and
    Framework unconstitutionally endorse Judaism, Christianity,
    and Islam, because the content calls for the teaching of
    religious events, significant to those religions, as historical
    fact. The complaint then alleges in the second Establishment
    clause claim that the content of the challenged materials has
    the primary effect of disparaging or denigrating Hinduism.
    All of Appellants’ constitutional claims thus relate to the
    particular passages in the Standards and Framework that they
    find objectionable. None challenge the Department of
    Education’s overall policy of providing students with an
    introduction to the major world religions and none relate to
    material students actually see in the classroom.
    D. The District Court’s Decisions
    The district court in a published opinion in 2017
    dismissed all of Appellants’ claims, with the exception of the
    Establishment clause claim relating to disparagement of
    Hinduism. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials
    v. Torlakson, 
    267 F. Supp. 3d 1218
     (N.D. Cal. 2017). The
    district court later, also in a published opinion, granted
    summary judgment to the State Board on that claim. See Cal.
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                       13
    Parents for Equalization of Education Materials v.
    Tolarkson, 
    370 F. Supp. 3d 1057
    , 1067–1083 (N.D. Cal.
    2019).
    In its first opinion dismissing most of CAPEEM’s claims,
    including the Equal Protection claims, the district court
    extensively examined our circuit’s leading case on Equal
    Protection challenges to educational materials, Monteiro v.
    Tempe Union School District, 
    158 F.3d 1022
     (9th Cir. 1998).
    In that case, Kathy Monteiro brought suit on behalf of her
    daughter, and argued that the curriculum’s inclusion of
    literary works containing racially derogatory terms, such as
    The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and A Rose For Emily,
    violated their Equal Protection rights. 
    Id.
     at 1024–25. Our
    opinion in Monteiro held that objections to curriculum
    assignments cannot form the basis of a viable Equal
    Protection claim, because curriculum decisions must remain
    the province of school authorities. Absent an allegation of an
    underlying racist policy, plaintiffs cannot challenge “the
    assignment of material deemed to have educational value by
    school authorities.” 
    Id.
     1031–32.
    We explained that permitting such Equal Protection
    challenges would infringe on other students’ First
    Amendment interests in reading the contested materials. 
    Id. at 1028
    . We saw the role of the school district in selecting
    curricula to be equally important. Permitting such challenges
    would “significantly interfere with the [school district]’s
    discretion to determine the composition of its curriculum.”
    
    Id. at 1029
    . We observed that the desire to avoid such
    lawsuits could “lead many school districts to ‘buy their
    peace’ by avoiding the books or other materials that express
    messages . . . that could be argued to cause harm to a group
    of students.” 
    Id.
     In other words, permitting Equal Protection
    14                CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    claims seeking removal of works from curriculum would
    have a significant chilling effect on the types of materials
    assigned by our public schools. 
    Id.
     This would, in turn,
    damage the quality of public education offered to students.
    “[T]he function of . . . education itself is to stimulate thought,
    to explore ideas, to engender intellectual exchanges. Bad
    ideas should be countered with good ones, not banned by the
    courts.” 
    Id. at 1032
    . We therefore held that the Equal
    Protection clause is not a vehicle for challenging curriculum
    content choices.
    The district court in this case concluded that the reasoning
    of Monteiro with respect to curricula applied equally to the
    materials challenged here that provide the general outlines for
    curriculum content. Following Monteiro, the district court
    ruled that Appellants’ objections to the content of the
    Standards and Framework did not state a plausible Equal
    Protection claim. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ.
    Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1232; see also Noonan, 
    600 F. Supp. 2d at 1111
     (holding that CAPEEM’s challenges to
    public school text books were barred by Monteiro). The
    court also concluded that Appellants’ indirect challenge to the
    content, through allegations of differential treatment in the
    Framework adoption process, was necessarily barred. Cal.
    Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d
    at 1234–35. Those allegations faulted the State Board’s
    rejection of Appellants’ proposed amendments to the
    Framework during the comment process, and acceptance of
    suggested edits of another group Appellants deemed hostile
    to Hinduism. The district court reasoned that it would render
    our decision in Monteiro meaningless if plaintiffs could make
    out an Equal Protection claim when a state official refuses to
    adopt plaintiffs’ content preferences during the comment
    process. Id. Constitutional challenges to the content of
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                         15
    curricula on religious grounds must be adjudicated under the
    religion clauses of the First Amendment, not Equal
    Protection. Id. at 1235.
    The district court also ruled that Appellants had failed to
    allege a plausible Free Exercise claim, because our case law
    requires Appellants to allege a substantial burden on their
    religious practice or exercise. Id. at 1226–27 (citing and
    discussing Am. Fam. Ass’n Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,
    
    277 F.3d 1114
    , 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2002)). In American
    Family, we rejected the argument that the Supreme Court had
    eliminated the need for plaintiffs to allege a substantial
    burden on their religious exercise where, as here, no law or
    other regulatory government conduct is involved. Am. Fam.
    Ass’n Inc., 
    277 F.3d at
    1123–24. Dismissal of the complaint
    in American Family was appropriate because “the complaint
    did not . . . allege any specific religious conduct that was
    affected by the Defendants’ actions.” 
    Id.
     Finding no such
    allegation in this case, the district court dismissed Appellants’
    Free Exercise clause claims. Cal. Parents for Equalization of
    Educ. Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1227.
    The district court additionally held that under our decision
    in Fields v. Palmdale School District, 
    427 F.3d 1197
     (9th Cir.
    2005), it was required to dismiss Plaintiffs’ substantive due
    process claims. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ.
    Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1224. In Fields, we explained
    that, under cases going back to Meyer v. Nebraska, 
    262 U.S. 390
     (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
    268 U.S. 510
    (1925), once parents select a school for their child, parents
    cannot “compel public schools to follow their own
    idiosyncratic views as to what information the schools may
    dispense.” Fields, 
    427 F.3d at 1206
    . Parents have only a
    limited substantive due process right “to be free from state
    16                CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    interference with their choice of the educational forum itself.”
    Fields, 
    427 F.3d at 1197, 1207
    . The district court concluded
    that the parents did not allege they were unable to send their
    children to the school of the parents’ choosing, and therefore
    did not state a plausible substantive due process claim. Cal.
    Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d
    at 1224–25.
    The district court dismissed one of Appellants’
    Establishment clause claims, concluding that an objective
    reading of the curriculum materials revealed no
    unconstitutional endorsement of Christianity, Judaism, or
    Islam. Id. at 1228. The materials permissibly called for
    students to learn about the major events and figures of various
    world religions. The district court did not, at the same time,
    dismiss Appellants’ other Establishment clause claim, that the
    curriculum materials had the primary effect of disparaging
    Hinduism, but later ruled against Appellants on that claim at
    summary judgment. See Cal. Parents for Equalization of
    Educ. Materials, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1067–1083.
    In that later opinion, the district court concluded that
    neither the allegations of the complaint, nor any additional
    materials adduced on summary judgment, reflected content
    that disparaged Hinduism. First, the district court explained
    that, contrary to Appellants’ contentions, the Standards and
    Framework do in fact describe the divine origins of Hinduism
    and the divine significance of the Bhagavad Gita and other
    sacred texts. Id. at 1070. Although Appellants had asserted
    that the Standards and Framework promote an outdated
    theory that Hinduism was the result of an Aryan invasion, the
    district court explained that the Standards and Framework,
    read together, refer to a migration of people speaking Indic
    languages southward into the region. Id. at 1074–75. The
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                         17
    materials also acknowledge a competing theory that the
    language spread northward. Neither theory suggests a
    connection between invasions and the development of
    Hinduism. Id. at 1075. The theories refer to historical
    events. As the district court summed it up, “[w]hether or not
    there was an influx of Aryans into South Asia in 1500 BCE
    is appropriately the subject of a history and social science
    curriculum, and not actually a positive or negative statement
    about Hinduism.” Id.
    The district court also dealt specifically with Appellants’
    argument that the material contains a description of the caste
    system as a Hindu religious belief and that the description has
    the primary effect of disparaging Hinduism. Id. at 1071–73.
    The court pointed out that the Framework expressly
    acknowledges that all early civilizations had social class
    systems. The Hindu religion was thus not singled out for
    criticism of its caste or class system. The district court, after
    examining the Standards and Framework, concluded that an
    objective, reasonable observer would not conclude that the
    materials have the primary effect of disparaging Hinduism.
    Id. at 1079.
    At summary judgment, Appellants offered an expert
    report to explain the significance of certain terms from the
    perspective of an academic religious scholar. The district
    court declined to consider the expert report. Id. at 1070 n.8.
    The court explained that the report was not relevant to the
    court’s analysis of the critical issue. Id. The question was
    whether the materials primarily communicate a message of
    disparagement from the perspective of a reasonable observer,
    and not from the perspective of an expert. The court cited
    Brown v. Woodland Joint School District, where we held that
    18                CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    expert testimony was irrelevant to the effect of challenged
    material on a child. Id.
    II. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
    A. Equal Protection
    The district court held that because Appellants’ Equal
    Protection claim was based on objections to course content,
    it was “squarely foreclosed” by Monteiro’s holding such
    challenges are barred. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ.
    Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1232. Appellants argue that
    Monteiro does not control because they allege a
    discriminatory policy exempted from Monteiro’s holding.
    There is no such allegation.
    Appellants’ brief recites the allegations of the complaint
    that the Standards and Framework discriminate against
    Hinduism by treating it less favorably than other religions.
    The allegations contain no reference to State Board policy,
    nor do the allegations describe any materials used in the
    classroom from which such a policy could be inferred. As the
    district court emphasized, the Standards and Framework are
    never seen by the students. See Cal. Parents for Equalization
    of Educ. Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1222 (“Notably,
    students do not read either the Standards or the
    Framework.”). The district court correctly characterized
    Appellants’ claims as an indirect attack on curricula.
    Plaintiffs are the parents of students, and the underlying harm
    Appellants are complaining of is alleged discrimination in the
    educational materials the students receive. Yet Monteiro
    holds that, at least absent evidence of unlawful intentional
    discrimination, parents are not entitled to bring Equal
    Protection claims challenging curriculum content. Monteiro,
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                       19
    
    158 F.3d at
    1031–32. Monteiro thus bars Appellants’
    principal Equal Protection claim. See id.; see also Noonan,
    
    600 F. Supp. 2d at 1111
    .
    Appellants separately challenge the process leading up to
    the adoption of the Framework as discriminatory against
    Hindus. Again, no discriminatory policy is described or
    articulated, only examples of what Appellants assert to be
    discriminatory treatment in the development of the content of
    the Framework. Appellants’ claim is that the State Board
    failed to incorporate their requested edits, and solicited and
    accepted some suggestions from a group of historical scholars
    that they regard as hostile to Hinduism. We agree with the
    State Board that Appellants may not like the edits made to the
    Framework, but that a dislike of challenged content does not
    constitute a constitutional violation of Equal Protection,
    absent a plausible allegation of discriminatory policy or
    intent. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 
    425 F.3d 1158
    ,
    1166–67 (9th Cir. 2005); Monteiro, 
    158 F.3d at 1026
    (explaining that, to plead a successful Equal Protection claim,
    plaintiffs must “plead intentional unlawful discrimination or
    allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of
    discriminatory intent.”). We therefore conclude that the
    district court properly dismissed both Equal Protection
    claims.
    B. Free Exercise
    The district court also dismissed Appellants’ Free
    Exercise clause claim because the court found Appellants
    failed to allege any burden on their religious exercise or
    practice. Appellants do not challenge that conclusion here.
    Pleading such a burden is required by our decisions in
    American Family Association, 
    277 F.3d at
    1124 and Vernon
    20                CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    v. City of Los Angeles, 
    27 F.3d 1385
    , 1393 (9th Cir. 1994).
    Appellants’ only argument is that the district court failed
    adequately to take into account three recent Supreme Court
    decisions, and that these decisions have eliminated the
    requirement that plaintiffs plead a burden on their religious
    exercise.
    The three recent Supreme Court cases are Trinity
    Lutheran Church v. Comer, 
    137 S.Ct. 2012
     (2017),
    Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,
    
    138 S.Ct. 1719
     (2018), and Espinoza v. Montana Department
    of Revenue, 
    140 S.Ct. 2246
    , 2252 (2020). Trinity Lutheran
    and Espinoza both involved state programs that excluded
    religious entities. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S.Ct. at 2017;
    Espinoza, 140 S.Ct. at 2252. Trinity Lutheran concerned
    exclusion of religious institutions from a state program
    providing assistance to schools. 137 S.Ct. at 2017. Espinoza
    dealt with a program granting tax credits for contributions to
    schools, but exempted contributions to religious schools.
    140 S.Ct. at 2252. In both cases, the Supreme Court held that
    the exclusion of religious institutions from the programs
    violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause. The
    Court ruled that the exclusion of religious institutions from
    beneficial programs amounted to a financial penalty, and that
    the Free Exercise clause prohibits such “indirect coercion or
    penalties on the free exercise of religion.” Trinity Lutheran,
    137 S.Ct. at 2022; Espinoza, 140 S.Ct. at 2256.
    Although the district court did not have the opportunity to
    analyze these cases in its opinion dismissing Appellants’ Free
    Exercise clause claims, these cases do not alter the district
    court’s analysis in this case. We are not dealing with a state
    program that provides financial or other similar benefits. The
    state has not carved out any exclusion for religious education
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                         21
    in the curriculum materials. Appellants allege no penalty or
    coerced conduct. As the district court said, Appellants failed
    to allege “any specific religious conduct that was affected by
    the Defendants’ actions.” Cal. Parents for Equalization of
    Educ. Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1226 (citing and quoting
    Am. Fam. Ass’n, 
    277 F.3d at 1124
    ). The complaint has not
    alleged interference with Appellants’ exercise of their
    religion under our Constitution as required for a viable Free
    Exercise claim under Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza.
    In the third recent case that Appellants cite, Masterpiece
    Cakeshop, the Supreme Court dealt with overt expressions of
    hostility on the part of officials adjudicating claims under a
    state’s civil rights law. 
    138 S.Ct. at
    1729–31. One official
    expressed deep and open skepticism as to whether the
    claimants’ religious beliefs were sincerely held. 
    Id. at 1729
    (“Freedom of religion . . . has been used to justify all kinds of
    discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery,
    whether it be the holocaust. . . it is one of the most despicable
    pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion
    to hurt others.”). The Court there held that such an
    expression of “clear and impermissible hostility toward the
    sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection”
    interfered with the claimant’s Free Exercise rights during that
    adjudicatory process. 
    Id. at 1729
    . We have no expressions
    of hostility here.
    Appellants allegations suggest at most that portions of the
    Standards and Framework contain material Appellants find
    offensive to their religious beliefs. As the district court said,
    “[a]t its core, Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise clause argument seems
    to be that the public school curriculum conflicts with their
    religious beliefs.” Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ.
    Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1226. Offensive content that
    22               CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    does not penalize, interfere with, or otherwise burden
    religious exercise does not violate Free Exercise rights. See
    Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 
    753 F.2d 1528
    , 1533–34
    (9th Cir. 1985); see also 
    id. at 1543
     (Canby, J., concurring)
    (“[G]overnmental actions that merely offend . . . religious
    beliefs do not on that account violate free exercise”; an
    “actual burden on the profession or exercise of religion is
    required.”).
    C. Substantive Due Process
    The Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process has
    a substantive component that includes a parent’s right to
    make decisions regarding the “care, custody and control of
    their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 69 (2000).
    Appellants recognize, however, that with respect to
    education, parents have the right to choose the educational
    forum, but not what takes place inside the school. As we said
    in Fields, the substantive due process right “does not extend
    beyond the threshold of the school door.” 
    427 F.3d at 1207
    .
    Parents therefore do not have a due process right to interfere
    with the curriculum, discipline, hours of instruction, or the
    nature of any other curricular or extracurricular activities.
    We reiterated this principle recently in McNeil v. Sherwood
    Sch. Dist. 88J, 
    918 F.3d 700
     (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
    We there repeated our statement in Fields that once the
    choice of school is made, parental rights are “substantially
    diminished.” 
    Id.
     at 711 (citing and quoting Fields, 
    427 F.3d at 1206
    ).
    In this appeal, Appellants argue that by recognizing a
    “diminished” substantive due process right in McNeil and
    Fields, we somehow, and without saying so, preserved their
    ability to raise religious objections to the Standards and
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                         23
    Framework. Citing a law review article, Appellants observe
    that the Supreme Court has used the due process clause to
    “further equality concerns . . . relating to . . . religious
    minorities.” Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection,
    
    124 Harv. L. Rev. 747
    , 749–50 (2011). They rely on this
    backdrop to support their argument for a broad due process
    right to challenge materials that they view as religiously
    bigoted. McNeil represents a refutation of Appellants’
    position. In McNeil, the parents complained about their
    child’s expulsion for creating a hit list. 918 F.3d at 704.
    There, we said that once parents select a school, they “accept[
    ] [that school’s] curriculum, school policies, and reasonable
    disciplinary measures.” Id. at 711. Our law has recognized
    no exceptions.
    D. Establishment Clause
    Appellants argue that the district court mishandled their
    Establishment clause claims in several respects. Without
    directly responding to the district court’s careful refutation of
    their characterizations of the Standards and Framework,
    Appellants argue that an objective reading of those materials
    reveals an impermissible endorsement of Judaism,
    Christianity, and Islam and that the court incorrectly granted
    the State Board summary judgment on Appellants’ claim that
    those materials disparage Hinduism. They also argue that the
    district court should not have excluded their expert report
    produced at summary judgment. We address each of these
    arguments in turn.
    Before addressing the merits of Appellants’ Establishment
    clause claims, however, we first address the evidentiary
    argument they raise. At summary judgment, Appellants
    produced an expert report in support of their claim that the
    24                CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    Standards and Framework have the primary effect of
    disparaging Hinduism. That expert report concluded that the
    1998 Standards contained outdated, offensive, and
    disparaging information about Hinduism. Appellants now
    argue that the district court improperly excluded that report
    because, without it, the offensiveness of certain terms is not
    obvious by reading the text of the Standards and Framework
    alone.
    But that absence of facially apparent disparagement is the
    reason why the district court excluded the expert report from
    its consideration, and also why Appellants’ claim that the
    Standards and Framework primarily communicate a message
    of disapproval of Hinduism fails. An expert’s understanding
    of the terms is irrelevant. We must evaluate the Standards
    and Framework from the perspective of an objective,
    reasonable observer, and not that of an academic who is an
    expert in the field. See e.g. Lee v. Weisman, 
    505 U.S. 577
    ,
    593 (1992); Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 
    597 F.3d 1007
    , 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Brown, 
    27 F.3d at 1382
     (agreeing with that district court that the expert opinion
    was not relevant to primary effect test). We therefore cannot
    conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
    refusing to consider Appellants’ expert report in its analysis.
    See id; Noonan, 
    600 F. Supp. 2d at 1118
     (rejecting “various
    expert opinions” offered by both parties).
    Turning now to the merits of Appellants’ Establishment
    clause claims, we conclude, as did the district court, that the
    Standards and Framework do not call for the teaching of
    biblical events or figures as historical fact, thereby implicitly
    endorsing Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The materials do
    not take a position on the historical accuracy of the stories or
    figures, and the Supreme Court has told us that mere
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                        25
    inclusion of passages from the Bible in course materials does
    not violate the Constitution. See Grove, 
    753 F.2d at
    1539–40
    (1985) (Canby, J. concurring) (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v.
    Schempp, 
    374 U.S. 203
    , 225 (1963)).
    We also conclude, as did the district court, that none of
    Appellants’ characterizations of the Hinduism materials as
    disparaging is supported by an objective reading of those
    materials. The Framework acknowledges the divine origins
    of Hinduism, and describes how these sacred beliefs were
    written down in texts like the Bhagavad Gita. See Cal.
    Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials, 370 F. Supp. 3d
    at 1071. The Standards and Framework reference an
    invasion, but do not call for teaching students that an invasion
    from the north caused the development of Hinduism in
    ancient India. From an objective perspective, none of the
    challenged material, alone or considered together, has the
    effect of disparaging Hinduism.
    We do not doubt the sincerity of Appellants’ challenge to
    the Standards and Framework. The courts are called upon to
    view the passages objectively and from the perspective of the
    reasonable person. See Brown, 
    27 F.3d at
    1378–79. As the
    district court noted, an “objective, reasonable observer would
    find much of the challenged material entirely
    unobjectionable.” Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ.
    Materials, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1079. But even if isolated
    passages could be read as implying some hostility toward
    religion—which they do not—they would not violate the
    Establishment clause unless that were the “principal or
    primary effect.” C.F. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist.,
    
    654 F.3d 975
    , 985–86 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Am. Fam. Ass’n,
    
    277 F.3d at 1121
    ). The Standards and Framework reflect
    26                CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON
    careful crafting by the State Board to achieve a balanced
    portrayal of different world religions.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The district court ably sorted through Appellants’
    allegations in this case to describe the deficiencies of their
    arguments in light of contemporary constitutional principles.
    We agree with the district court that the challenged content of
    the Standards and Framework, and process leading up to the
    Framework’s adoption, did not disparage or otherwise
    express hostility to Hinduism in violation of the Constitution.
    AFFIRMED.
    BRESS, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    The majority opinion correctly holds that there is no basis
    in this record to conclude that the defendants discriminated
    against Hinduism, expressed a hostility toward it, or burdened
    the practice of that religion. The majority opinion also
    properly rejects the plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause
    challenge. The Establishment Clause certainly does not
    prevent California from educating students about world
    religions and their role in human civilizations. See, e.g.,
    Lynch v. Donnelly, 
    465 U.S. 668
    , 679–80 (1984). Plaintiffs’
    efforts to wring an Establishment Clause violation from
    subtle differences that they perceive in the curricular
    treatment of various religions does not withstand scrutiny,
    and, if accepted, would paralyze educators in their lawful
    objective of treating religion as a topic relevant to world
    history.
    CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON                       27
    I note that some portions of the majority opinion
    discussing plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim draw upon
    Ninth Circuit precedent that is based on Lemon v. Kurtzman,
    
    403 U.S. 602
     (1971). The list of situations in which the
    Supreme Court has effectively repudiated the Lemon test,
    either by “expressly declin[ing] to apply the test or [] simply
    ignor[ing] it,” has grown quite long. American Legion v.
    American Humanist Ass’n, 
    139 S. Ct. 2067
    , 2080 (2019)
    (plurality op.). But to my understanding, the circuit precedent
    on which the majority opinion relies remains binding on this
    panel in this case. Regardless, whether under a Lemon-based
    test or an Establishment Clause analysis more appropriately
    grounded in the history and traditions of this country, 
    id.
    at 2089–90; 
    id.
     at 2092–94 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); 
    id. at 2096
     (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), there was
    no establishment of religion here.