Local 387 Ibew v. Navopache Elec. Coop., Inc. ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 12 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LOCAL 387 INTERNATIONAL                         No.   19-15588
    BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
    WORKERS,                                        D.C. No.
    CV-18-04108-PHX-SRB
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    NAVOPACHE ELECTRIC
    COOPERATIVE, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 8, 2020**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: WATFORD and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and BATTAGLIA, *** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Anthony J. Battaglia, United States District Judge for
    the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
    Local 387 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the “Union”) and
    Navopache Electrical Cooperative, Inc. entered into a three-year collective
    bargaining agreement (“CBA”) in 2015. During bargaining in 2018 regarding
    proposed amendments to the new CBA, the Union and Navopache were unable to
    reach agreement on the CBA’s management rights’ clause. On November 16, 2018,
    the Union filed a Petition to Compel Arbitration (the “Petition”). The district court
    granted the Petition and referred the matter to interest arbitration. Navopache now
    timely appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We have jurisdiction of the appeal under 28
    U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
    Although we agree with the district court that the relevant language of the
    CBA is not “the epitome of draftsmanship,” we also agree that it requires the parties
    to submit this dispute to interest arbitration. Although the words “interest
    arbitration” do not appear in the CBA, Article VII, Section 5(b) clearly contemplates
    the arbitration of such disputes: “Except as to matters submitted to arbitration
    regarding matters arising out of differences concerning amendments to this
    Agreement at termination, the Arbitrator’s authority shall be limited to the
    interpretation and application of this Agreement.” Moreover, Navopache concedes
    that the parties agreed to interest arbitration during the term of the CBA under Article
    VIII, Section 2, and Article XI provides that “this Agreement shall remain in full
    force and in effect during such period of negotiation as well as during the period of
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    arbitration provided in Article VII, should any amendment be submitted for
    arbitration as therein provided.” See Beach Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. Sheet
    Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 
    55 F.3d 474
    , 476 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he mere expiration
    of an agreement doesn’t terminate all obligations imposed by it, as interest
    arbitration clauses survive expiration of the agreement.”).
    Navopache asserts that the CBA provisions should be viewed only as
    permissive – meaning that disputes are only submitted to interest arbitration if a
    party first obtains the other party’s consent. However, a presumption of arbitrability
    exists in the instant litigation. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am.,
    
    475 U.S. 643
    , 650 (1986); Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery &
    Confectionery Workers Union, 
    430 U.S. 243
    , 254–55 (1997); see also Hotel & Rest.
    Emps., & Bartenders Union, Local 703 v. Williams, 
    752 F.2d 1476
    , 1479 (9th Cir.
    1985). And, that is not what Article VII says; it refers to “matters submitted to
    arbitration” without any requirement that both parties agree to submission. See Trs.
    of S. Cal. IBEW-NECA Pension Tr. Fund v. Flores, 
    519 F.3d 1045
    , 1047 (9th Cir.
    2008); see also Alday v. Raytheon Co., 
    693 F.3d 772
    , 784 (9th Cir. 2012) (“As in all
    contracts, the collective bargaining agreement’s terms must be construed so as to
    render none nugatory and avoid illusory promises.” (quoting Smith v. ABS Indus.,
    Inc., 
    890 F.2d 841
    , 845 (6th Cir. 1989))). There is no language in the CBA that
    requires a separate standalone agreement as a prerequisite to interest arbitration once
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    the term of the CBA has expired. The district court correctly read the CBA as
    empowering an arbitrator to resolve the parties’ differences concerning amendments
    to the CBA and did not err in compelling interest arbitration.
    AFFIRMED.
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