Elizabeth Hart v. Charter Communications, Inc. ( 2020 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 15 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ELIZABETH HART, individually, and on            No.    19-55538
    behalf of all others similarly situated,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            8:17-cv-00556-DOC-RAO
    and
    MEMORANDUM*
    LEROY ROBERSON,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.;
    SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT HOLDING
    COMPANY, LLC,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 6, 2020
    Pasadena, California
    Before: GOULD and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and STEIN,** District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Sidney H. Stein, United States District Judge for the
    Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Elizabeth Hart (“Hart”) appeals the district court’s order
    compelling arbitration. Hart filed a putative class action under the Class Action
    Fairness Act against Defendants-Appellees Spectrum Management Holding Co.,
    LLC (“Spectrum”) and Spectrum’s parent company, Charter Communications, Inc.
    (“Charter”) (collectively, “Appellees”). Hart alleged Time Warner Cable, Inc.
    (“TWC”), which merged into Spectrum in 2016, defrauded and misled consumers
    who bought residential Internet services and enrolled in automatic bill payment.
    Appellees moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration
    Act (“FAA”), 
    9 U.S.C. §§ 3
    –4, arguing that Hart had accepted prior TWC
    subscriber agreements that bind subscribers to arbitration. The district court
    granted the motion, holding that Hart had inquiry notice of a 2014 TWC subscriber
    agreement and assented to the agreement by continuing to accept TWC’s services.
    The district court held that Appellees, as TWC’s successors, could enforce the
    terms of the agreement, including the arbitration clause.
    We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion to compel
    arbitration. Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 
    360 F.3d 1149
    , 1152 (9th Cir.
    2004). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    9 U.S.C. § 16
    (a)(1)(D) and (a)(3), and we affirm.
    1.     “In determining whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, federal
    courts apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.”
    2
    Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 
    763 F.3d 1171
    , 1175 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations
    omitted). The parties agree that California law applies.
    Under California law, “mutual assent is a required element of contract
    formation.” Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 
    771 F.3d 559
    , 565 (9th Cir. 2014).
    “[A]n offeree, knowing that an offer has been made to [her] but not knowing all of
    its terms, may be held to have accepted, by [her] conduct, whatever terms the offer
    contains.” Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 
    101 Cal. Rptr. 347
    , 351
    (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
    The district court did not err by determining that Hart had inquiry notice of
    TWC’s 2014 subscriber agreement as a result of the notice she received in two
    billing statements. The notice was sufficiently clear and conspicuous to provide a
    reasonably prudent subscriber with constructive notice of the proposed contract
    terms. See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177. Because there is no dispute Hart received
    the relevant billing statements, Hart’s continued acceptance of TWC’s services
    constituted assent to the agreement. See Harris v. Superior Court, 
    233 Cal. Rptr. 186
    , 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Hart is bound by the terms of the 2014 subscriber
    agreement, including the arbitration clause.
    2.     Under California contract law, “[n]onsignatory defendants may
    enforce arbitration agreements where there is sufficient identity of parties.” Jenks
    v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP, 
    196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237
    , 243 (Cal. Ct.
    
    3 App. 2015
    ) (quotations omitted). When the identity of interest is based on a
    merger, the court will look to whether the surviving entity (the non-signatory)
    “assumed all of the rights and obligations of the acquired corporation” (the
    signatory). See Marenco v. DirecTV LLC, 
    183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587
    , 593 (Cal. Ct.
    App. 2015).
    Under Delaware corporate law, which applies because the entities were
    organized under Delaware law, TWC automatically transferred its “rights,
    privileges and powers” to Spectrum pursuant to the merger. See 
    Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-209
    (g). As TWC’s successor-in-interest, Spectrum has the authority to
    enforce the arbitration agreement between Hart and TWC. Charter, Spectrum’s
    parent company, also can enforce the agreement because Hart sued both Spectrum
    and Charter, bringing identical claims against them. See Boucher v. All. Title Co.,
    Inc., 
    25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 440
    , 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a parent company
    can enforce a subsidiary’s arbitration agreement where “a plaintiff has an
    arbitration agreement with a subsidiary corporation; the plaintiff sues the parent
    corporation; and the plaintiff’s claims against the parent company are based on the
    same facts and are inherently inseparable”).
    3.      Hart argues for the first time on appeal that her opt-out of the
    arbitration clause in the 2017 subscriber agreement supersedes any prior agreement
    to arbitrate. We consider this argument to be forfeited because it was not raised
    4
    below. See Smith v. Marsh, 
    194 F.3d 1045
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“As a general
    rule, we will not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.”).
    4.     We review a district court’s denial of a request for discovery for abuse
    of discretion. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 
    175 F.3d 716
    , 726 (9th Cir. 1999).
    Under the FAA, discovery in connection with a motion to compel arbitration is
    allowed only if “the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or
    refusal to perform the same be in issue.” 
    9 U.S.C. § 4
    . The district court did not
    abuse its discretion by determining there were no triable issues as to whether Hart
    was bound by the 2014 arbitration agreement and by denying Hart’s request for
    pre-arbitration discovery.
    AFFIRMED.
    5