Corazon Pascual v. Michael Astrue ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 17 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CORAZON S. PASCUAL, No. 09-15935
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:08-cv-02906-SBA
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Saundra B. Armstrong, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 25, 2010 **
Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Corazon S. Pascual appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Diaz v.
Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Pascual’s ADEA
claim because she did not raise a triable issue that she was performing her job in a
satisfactory manner or that her discharge gave rise to an inference of age
discrimination. Id. at 1207-08 (to establish a prima facie case under the ADEA a
plaintiff must demonstrate that she was (1) at least forty years old, (2) performing
her job satisfactorily, and (3) discharged (4) under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of age discrimination).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Pascual’s hostile
work environment claim because she failed to raise a triable issue regarding
whether her supervisor’s conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of her employment. See Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097,
1108-09 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment on hostile work
environment claim under Title VII where the negative comments about plaintiff
were not sufficiently severe or pervasive); see also Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced
Comty. Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1991) (a hostile work
environment claim under Title VII or the ADEA requires proof of severe or
pervasive and unwelcome verbal or physical harassment because of a plaintiff’s
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membership in a protected class), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005).
We do not consider Pascual’s claims that are raised for the first time on
appeal. See Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998).
Pascual’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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