United States v. Concepcion-Alvarado , 385 F. App'x 763 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 01 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 08-10073
Plaintiff - Appellee, DC No. CR 05-1308 JMR
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ERIC ALEXANDER CONCEPCION-
ALVARADO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John M. Roll, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 14, 2010 **
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TASHIMA, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Eric Concepcion-Alvarado (“Concepcion”) appeals from the
judgment entered on January 30, 2008, following his plea of guilty to illegal
reentry into the United States. Concepcion contends that the trial court violated his
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case to be suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
due process rights by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding his
competency before accepting his guilty plea. He also argues that the trial court
clearly erred by determining that he was competent to plead guilty.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
B ACKGROUND
Concepcion was arrested on June 11, 2005 and charged with illegal reentry
after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Over the course of the district court
proceedings, Concepcion was represented by four court-appointed attorneys, at
least two of whom moved to withdraw because of a lack of communication or
understanding.
At the request of Concepcion’s fourth attorney, the magistrate judge ordered
two psychological evaluations. Neither evaluation indicated that Concepcion was
not competent to stand trial. Concepcion’s attorney contested the conclusions
contained in the reports, and the magistrate scheduled a status conference to
determine whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary. Before the date of the
status conference, however, Concepcion filed a notice for a change of plea hearing.
The status conference was taken off calendar and Concepcion pleaded guilty. At
the plea hearing, his attorney acknowledged that she believed Concepcion was
competent to plead guilty. The court sentenced Concepcion to seventy-seven
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months’ imprisonment and thirty-six months of supervised release. This timely
appeal followed.
S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
Our review of the district court’s failure to provide a competency hearing is
“comprehensive.” Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1987). The question
is whether substantial evidence of incompetence exists “such that a reasonable
judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting the defendant’s
competence.” United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 814 (9th Cir. 2008).
We review a district court’s determination that a defendant is competent to
stand trial for clear error. United States v. Gastelum-Almeida, 298 F.3d 1167, 1171
(9th Cir. 2002).
D ISCUSSION
A district court must order a competency hearing either on the motion of a
party or sua sponte, where there is “reasonable cause to believe that the defendant
may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Here, substantial evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt as
to Concepcion’s competence. First and foremost, the magistrate judge granted
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Concepcion’s request to be evaluated first by a psychologist of his choice, and later
by the medical team at a psychiatric hospital of his choice over an extended period.
The psychological evaluations from both sources concluded that Concepcion was
competent. In addition, during the course of the proceedings before the court,
Concepcion did not exhibit any signs of mental disease indicative of incompetence.
See United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1251 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that a
defendant’s irrational behavior and demeanor in court are factors which a court
may consider in determining competency). Further, Concepcion’s attorney
acknowledged at the plea hearing that her client was competent to plead.
We reject Concepcion’s contention that he was incompetent because he did
not understand his lawyers and the legal system. The magistrate judge reasonably
interpreted Concepcion’s asserted “lack of understanding” as reflecting a
disagreement with the law rather than an inability to understand the proceedings.
A refusal to believe what the law is does not, on its own, amount to incompetence.
See Marks, 530 F.3d at 814-15 (concluding that the defendant’s belief that the
court lacked legal authority over him was “not indicative of an inability to
understand the proceedings against him or conduct his own defense”).
Concepcion’s contention that the district court was required to hold a
competency hearing under United States v. Nevarez-Castro, 120 F.3d 190 (9th Cir.
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1997), similarly lacks merit. Nevarez-Castro is inapposite because here, the court
never found that Concepcion was incompetent under § 4241(d). See id. at 191;
Formhals v. United States, 278 F.2d 43, 48 (9th Cir. 1960) (“[A]fter an accused
has been judicially determined incompetent to stand trial, he cannot be brought to
trial unless there has been a subsequent judicial determination of restored
competency.” (emphasis added)).
The district court sufficiently inquired into Concepcion’s competence.
Because substantial evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt as to his
competency, the district court also did not clearly err in finding that Concepcion
was competent to plead guilty.
C ONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.
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