Bryan Madeira v. Converse, Inc. ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 19 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRYAN MADEIRA, an individual, and on No. 20-55958
behalf of others similarly situated,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellee, 5:19-cv-00154-CJC-SP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CONVERSE, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 15, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: MURGUIA and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and SETTLE,*** District Judge.
Converse, Inc. appeals the district court’s order remanding the case to state
court. The remand was issued sua sponte after the district court denied Bryan
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Benjamin H. Settle, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Madeira’s motion for class certification, reasoning that the court no longer had
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). We reverse.
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under CAFA. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).
We review the district court’s order remanding the case back to state court for lack
of CAFA jurisdiction de novo. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg.,
Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087,
1090 (9th Cir. 2010); Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2013).
The district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of L.A., 159
F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998).
Madeira filed a class action in state court alleging state law claims for wage-
and-hour violations and a cause of action under the California Private Attorneys
General Act (“PAGA”). Converse removed the case to federal court under CAFA.
Madeira filed a motion for class certification, and when the district court denied
Madeira’s motion it sua sponte remanded the entire action back to state court
reasoning that it no longer had jurisdiction under CAFA.
Where, as here, jurisdiction was proper at the time of removal, subsequent
dismissal of class claims does not defeat the court’s CAFA jurisdiction over
remaining individual claims. United Steel, 602 F.3d at 1092 (“[A] district court’s
subsequent denial of Rule 23 class certification does not divest the court of
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jurisdiction, and it should not remand the case to state court.”); Visendi, 733 F.3d at
868. The district court therefore erred in remanding Madeira’s individual claims for
lack of jurisdiction.
However, unlike the individual claims subject to CAFA jurisdiction at the
time of removal, the district court did not have original jurisdiction over the PAGA
claims. Instead, the district court had discretion to either exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the PAGA claims or remand them back to state court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a), (c). The district court did not provide a reason for declining supplemental
jurisdiction over the PAGA claims, but such an omission is not an abuse of
discretion. San Pedro Hotel, 159 F.3d at 478–79.
However, in the interest of judicial economy, we invite and encourage the
district court to re-evaluate whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
PAGA claims in light of our holding that it must adjudicate Madeira’s individual
claims. If upon re-evaluation the district court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the PAGA claims, it should indicate which § 1367(c) exception
underlies its decision and elaborate on its reasoning to permit a more meaningful
review in the event that decision is appealed.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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