Geraldine Trice v. Lmic ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    MAR 21 2023
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GERALDINE TRICE,                                No. 21-16422
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:20-cv-02139-KJD-NJK
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 14, 2023**
    Before:      SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
    Geraldine Trice appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    her diversity action alleging state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6). Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 
    15 F.4th 885
    ,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    889 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Trice’s breach of contract claim as
    barred by her insurance contract’s one-year limitation period. See Clark v. Truck
    Ins. Exch., 
    598 P.2d 628
    , 629-30 (Nev. 1979) (explaining that the twelve-month
    limitation period starts to run no later than when the insurer formally denies
    liability).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Trice’s motion for
    reconsideration because Trice set forth no valid grounds for reconsideration. See
    Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 
    5 F.3d 1255
    , 1262-63
    (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration
    under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60).
    The district court properly denied Trice’s motion to remand the case to state
    court because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    . See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    (a) (setting forth requirements for diversity
    jurisdiction); Yocupicio v. PAE Grp., LLC, 
    795 F.3d 1057
    , 1059 (9th Cir. 2015)
    (setting forth standard of review); Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Higashiguchi, 
    109 F.3d 1471
    , 1473 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A claim in excess of the requisite amount, made
    in good faith in the complaint, satisfies the jurisdictional requirement.”).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, including Trice’s contentions regarding the district court’s
    2                                     21-16422
    dismissal of her good faith and fair dealing and Nevada statutory claims. See
    Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); Indep. Towers of Wash.
    v. Washington, 
    350 F.3d 925
    , 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e will not consider any
    claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s opening brief.”).
    We reject as meritless Trice’s contentions that jurisdiction was “divested”
    under 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (d) of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
    Enforcement Act; that the district court’s dismissal violated 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    ; and
    that the district court’s decision was based on fraud, constituted an obstruction of
    justice, violated due process, violated the right to trial, or impermissibly relied on
    hearsay.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                     21-16422