Yeremi Garcia-Quezada v. Merrick Garland ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 24 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YEREMI JEFFERSON EDUARDO No. 20-72669
GARCIA-QUEZADA,
Agency No. A208-890-305
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 19, 2021
Submission Vacated November 24, 2021
Resubmitted March 23, 2023
San Francisco, California
Before: PAEZ, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Yeremi Garcia-Quezada, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for
review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding an
immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny Garcia-Quezada’s petition.
We review “factual findings, including adverse credibility decisions, under
the deferential substantial evidence standard.” Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091
(9th Cir. 2014). Under this standard, we “must uphold the agency determination
unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr,
918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). The agency is required “to provide specific
and cogent reasons for an adverse credibility determination.” Iman v. Barr, 972
F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing
an adverse credibility finding under the REAL ID Act, we “must look to the
totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors.” Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th
1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (cleaned up).
Here, the IJ based his adverse credibility finding on inconsistencies between
Garcia-Quezada’s sworn statements, portions of those statements that he found
implausible, and Garcia-Quezada’s admission to lying under oath in his asylum
interview. A particularly concerning issue, according to the IJ, was Garcia-
Quezada’s untruthfulness in testifying about his relationship with two of his
siblings.
In his interview with the Asylum Officer (AO), Garcia-Quezada explained
that after his grandmother was murdered, the 18th Street Gang went after him and
two of his siblings, threatening to kill his siblings if he didn’t join the gang and to
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kill him if they didn’t join. When the AO asked if he was still in contact with his
siblings, he reported that they talked “every now and then” but “not consistently,”
adding that he had last spoken with them “[l]ike one month prior” to the interview
and that they had warned him that the gang was still after him. During the hearing
before the IJ, however, Garcia-Quezada at first denied having siblings, then denied
knowing anything about them. He testified that he had never met them, spoken to
them, or lived with them. His earlier statements to the AO, he admitted, were all
false—he had lied about his siblings because he was “nervous” and “didn’t know
what to answer.”
We have previously held that a petitioner’s deliberate decision to lie to
immigration authorities “always counts as substantial evidence supporting an
adverse credibility finding” unless the lie was designed to help the petitioner
escape immediate danger or gain entry into the United States. Singh v. Holder, 643
F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011). Although it is unclear whether this categorical
rule survives our recent decision in Alam, we need not decide that question,
because the outcome here is the same under either the categorical rule or Alam’s
totality of the circumstances approach. Even accounting for all of Garcia-
Quezada’s testimony and the circumstances surrounding it, there is substantial
evidence to support the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.
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The IJ cited to several other factors to justify his adverse credibility finding.
These include the fact that Garcia-Quezada at different points testified that the man
who killed his grandmother did not speak and that the man had said that he would
kill Garcia-Quezada if he did not join the gang; that he contradicted himself about
whether he had lived with his father in Guatemala; and that the IJ found it
implausible that the gang would threaten Garcia-Quezada for six years without
harming him, even though they saw him frequently. These are relevant and
substantive inconsistencies and implausibilities, and they raise legitimate questions
about the veracity of Garcia-Quezada’s claims. Not all of the factors cited by the
IJ are supported by substantial evidence: As the government admits, the IJ erred in
finding that there was an inconsistency about the amount of time Garcia-Quezada’s
grandmother was in the hospital and regarding his report to police. However,
considering the entire record and the totality of the circumstances, substantial
evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.
Garcia-Quezada’s false statements cannot be excused by the fact that he was
nervous talking to the AO, or by his age either at the time of the interview or when
he witnessed the relevant events. It is true that noncitizen children have a unique
status in the immigration system and that IJs should take care to account for their
youth, including in making credibility determinations. See Hernandez-Ortiz v.
Gonzales, 496 F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2007). We have also recognized that
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fear and the lingering effects of trauma can have a marked impact on an
individual’s memory, regardless of his age. Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081,
1091 (9th Cir. 2005). Even recognizing the significant anxiety Garcia-Quezada
likely felt proceeding through the immigration process as a child, there was still
sufficient evidence to support the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.
In the absence of credible testimony or any objective evidence supporting
Garcia-Quezada’s asylum claim, the BIA did not err in concluding that he failed to
meet his burden of proof for such relief. 1 Nor did the BIA err in rejecting his
withholding claim, since it was based on the same evidence and subject to a more
rigorous standard. See de Leon-Barrios v. INS, 116 F.3d 391, 394 (9th Cir. 1997).
Finally, given Garcia-Quezada’s non-credible testimony and the fact that he
offered no evidence establishing that he would be at risk of torture if he were
returned to Guatemala, the BIA also did not err in rejecting his CAT claim. See
Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
1
The BIA found that it was unnecessary to reach Garcia-Quezada’s remaining
arguments regarding his membership in a social group, well-founded fear of
persecution, and inability to safely relocate within the country in light of the
adverse credibility determination. Although Garcia-Quezada raises those issues in
his briefing, we need not reach them for similar reasons.
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