Sherida Carillo Aguilar v. Robert Wilkinson ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 9 2021
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
SHERIDA ARACELY CARRILLO AGUILAR, No. 19-71635
AKA Luz Mariana Jimenez-Giron,
Agency No. A201-147-597
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 31, 2020**
Seattle, Washington
Before: BYBEE and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and BASTIAN,*** District Judge.
Sherida Aracely Carrillo Aguilar, a citizen and native of Guatemala,
petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
affirming the order of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her request for
withholding of removal and ordering her removed to Guatemala. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
***
The Honorable Stanley Allen Bastian, Chief United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252,
and we deny the petition.
To establish her eligibility for withholding of removal, Carrillo Aguilar had
to show that, if removed to Guatemala, she would likely suffer persecution
“because of [her] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see also id.§ 1231(b)(3)(C). Before the agency, Carrillo Aguilar asserted that she had
established that she would be persecuted on account of two such protected
grounds, namely, “membership in a particular social group” and “political
opinion.” The IJ rejected both such asserted grounds, and the BIA’s decision
upheld those conclusions. In reviewing that decision, we review the agency’s legal
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Bringas-
Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). A finding is
supported by substantial evidence unless “‘any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary’ based on the evidence in the record.” Id.(simplified) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Carrillo
Aguilar’s proposed social group of “young single Guatemalan women without
significant family protection” was not sufficiently “socially distinct within the
society in question” and therefore not cognizable. See Conde Quevedo v. Barr,
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947 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). As she did before the BIA,
Carrillo Aguilar relies heavily on her testimony concerning her own experiences,
which makes clear that Carrillo Aguilar believed that her status as a young single
woman with no significant family protection left her vulnerable to abuse from her
persecutor (Marcos) and from others in the community. Carrillo Aguilar also notes
that Marcos had harassed other single women in the area. But this evidence does
not compel the conclusion that Guatemalan society recognizes young single
women without significant family protection as a socially distinct group. See id.(social distinction “is determined by ‘the perception of the society in question’”
(citations omitted)). Carrillo Aguilar also points to an expert declaration and other
documentary evidence submitted before the IJ.1 These materials indicate that
Guatemalan women face disturbingly high rates of murder and sexual abuse, but
that evidence did not require the agency to conclude that Guatemalan society views
as socially distinct the subset of women who are “young single Guatemalan
women without significant family protection.”
2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Carrillo
Aguilar had not shown that “she was or will be targeted by Marcos based on her
1
Carrillo Aguilar wrongly contends that the BIA erred by failing to specifically
mention this evidence in its decision. As the BIA correctly noted, the only
evidence Carrillo Aguilar cited in her brief to the BIA on this issue was her own
testimony.
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political views” about gender roles. The BIA here held that “Marcos’s behavior,
while threatening and abhorrent, appears to have [been] governed solely by his
personal desire to be in a relationship with the applicant, not because of her actual
or imputed political views” (emphasis added). The agency could reasonably reach
that conclusion on this record. As the IJ noted, Marcos did not know anything
about Carrillo Aguilar’s political views “when he decided to target her,” and the
fact that she later mentioned such views to him did not require the agency to
conclude that, thereafter, he targeted her in part because of such views. Rather, the
agency permissibly concluded that his sole motivation remained his “personal
desire to be in a relationship with the applicant.”
Finally, Carrillo Aguilar argues that, in its discussion of this issue, the BIA
erroneously referenced the wrong legal standard. A withholding of removal claim
requires a showing only that the applicant’s political views were “a reason” for the
persecution, which is a more lenient standard than the “one central reason”
standard applied in asylum cases. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358–
60 (9th Cir. 2017). The Government concedes that, by referencing the “one central
reason” standard, the BIA erred. Nonetheless, because substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s conclusion that Marcos’s sole motivation was his personal
desire, “neither the result nor the BIA’s basic reasoning would change” under the
correct standard, and a remand is not required. See Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822,
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827 (9th Cir. 2019) (no remand required, despite Barajas-Romero error, where
agency found that there was “no nexus” at all).
3. For these reasons, the agency properly concluded that Carrillo Aguilar
had failed to show a likelihood of future persecution, and her withholding claim
therefore fails. See Robleto-Pastora v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1051, 1057–58 (9th Cir.
2010).
The petition for review is DENIED.
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