Jane Doe v. Housing Authority of Portland , 644 F. App'x 722 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 03 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JANE DOE, elderly, disabled woman, No. 15-35246
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:13-cv-01974-SI
v.
MEMORANDUM*
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF
PORTLAND, a public municipal
corporation, DBA Home Forward; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 24, 2016**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Jane Doe appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her
action alleging various claims, including that defendants failed to accommodate
her disability in violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”). We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Budnick v. Town of
Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Doe’s FHAA and
Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) claims because Doe failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether her requested accommodations were reasonable, or
necessary for the equal use and enjoyment of her apartment. See id. at 1119
(elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim under the FHAA); Giebeler v. M&B
Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1148-49, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (for purposes of the FHAA
and RA, an accommodation is reasonable “when it imposes no fundamental
alteration in the nature of the program or undue financial or administrative
burdens” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 24 C.F.R.
§§ 982.405(a), 982.551(d) (requiring that public housing agencies inspect units at
least annually and that Section 8 voucher recipients allow such inspections). We
reject as unsupported by the record Doe’s contention that defendants failed to
conduct an interactive process.
Contrary to Doe’s contention, the district court provided her a final warning
of her deadline to file an opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
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appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Doe’s request to supplement the record, set forth in her opening brief, is
denied.
AFFIRMED.
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