United States v. Joel Salcedo ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 12 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-10455
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
4:16-cr-00382-HSG-5
v.
JOEL SALCEDO, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, IKUTA, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Joel Salcedo appeals the district court’s dismissal of two prospective jurors
for cause and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his
conviction for conspiring to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to
distribute heroin and methamphetamine. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291, and we affirm.
We “review[] a court’s findings regarding actual juror bias ‘for manifest
error’ or abuse of discretion.” United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2000) (“Because determinations of impartiality may be based in large part
upon demeanor, this court typically accords deference to the district court’s
determinations, and reviews a court’s findings regarding actual juror bias ‘for
manifest error’ or abuse of discretion.”). We review de novo “whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Espinoza-Valdez, 889 F.3d 654, 656 (9th Cir.
2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Though we review de novo Salcedo’s
claim of insufficient evidence, “our evaluation remains deferential and accords
respect to the jury’s role as weigher of the evidence.” United States v. Moe, 781
F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court did not manifestly err or abuse its discretion in dismissing
the two prospective jurors for cause. Both made specific statements—in their juror
questionnaires and during voir dire—regarding beliefs or opinions that could have
prevented or substantially impaired the performance of their duties as jurors.
United States v. Padilla-Mendoza, 157 F.3d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The central
inquiry in determining whether a juror should be removed for cause is whether that
2
juror holds a particular belief or opinion that will prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even were these dismissals manifest
error or an abuse of discretion, reversal would still not be warranted because the
“core question” is whether Salcedo’s constitutional right to an impartial jury has
been violated, and he “presented no evidence that any of the jurors that found him
guilty were unable or unwilling to properly perform their duties.” Id. at 734(concluding that the district court abused its discretion in improperly excluding two
jurors but error did not require reversal).
The trial evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
government, was sufficient to support Salcedo’s heroin and methamphetamine
conspiracy conviction. Considering the relevant factors set forth in United States
v. Moe, 781 F.3d at 1125–26, in the context of the entire course of dealing between
the alleged co-conspirators, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Oscar Escalante and Salcedo were co-conspirators rather than simply
engaged in a buyer-seller relationship. Alternatively, a rational juror could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Salcedo and the associate who accompanied
him to the May 2016 drug transaction were co-conspirators.
AFFIRMED.
3