C. Luckett v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co ( 2021 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 12 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
C. DEWAYNE LUCKETT, a Washington No. 20-35337
resident,
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00170-RAJ
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a foreign corporation doing
business in Washington,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 1, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: TASHIMA, RAWLINSON, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Plaintiff-appellant C. Dewayne Luckett appeals the district court’s entry of
summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee State Farm Auto Insurance
Company on Luckett’s declaratory relief and bad faith claims arising out of his
claim for Underinsured Motorist (UIM) benefits from his State Farm policy.1 We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo and may affirm the district court on any basis
supported by the record. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). We affirm.
The district court correctly determined that Luckett was not entitled to UIM
benefits under his policy because he had already received all that he was “legally
entitled to recover” through settlement. See Wash. Rev. Code § 48.22.030(1). The
purpose of UIM coverage is to “place the insured in the same position as if the
tortfeasor carried [adequate] liability insurance.” Dayton v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 876
P.2d 896, 898 (Wash. 1994) (en banc). Luckett received the entire amount of the
damages he was awarded through a post-judgment settlement, except for a small
portion, which he waived to satisfy the judgment in his favor. Allowing Luckett to
1
Luckett also brought claims under Washington’s Insurance Fair Conduct
Act (Wash. Rev. Code § 48.30.015) and Consumer Protection Act (Wash. Rev.
Code § 19.86.090). Luckett did not raise these issues in his opening brief, and has
waived them on appeal. See Paciulan v. George, 229 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.
2000).
2
also recover UIM benefits would contravene Washington law by effectively
allowing him a double recovery and would place him in a better position by having
been struck by an underinsured driver as opposed to an adequately insured driver.
See id.; Ellwein v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 15 P.3d 640, 647 (Wash. 2001)
(en banc), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Safeco Ins. Co., 78 P.3d 1274(Wash. 2003) (en banc).
Further, Luckett was not entitled to receive UIM benefits for damages
arising out of his own contributory negligence. In Washington, UIM coverage
“extends no farther than the legal liability of the involved tortfeasors, if any.”
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dejbod, 818 P.2d 608, 611 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). Standard
liability insurance and UIM coverage work in tandem to “fully compensate
claimants for those amounts that they are legally entitled to recover from liable
tortfeasors.” Id. (citations omitted). Once Luckett accepted the settlement
agreement in exchange for satisfaction of judgment, he was no longer legally
entitled to damages from the tortfeasor. See Dayton, 876 P.2d at 898 (“UIM
carriers are not compelled to pay when the same recovery could not have been
obtained from the [under]insured tortfeasor.” (citation omitted)). The judgment
being satisfied, Luckett was no longer legally entitled to recover from his UIM
policy.
3
The district court properly rejected Luckett’s bad faith claim. The insurer in
a UIM dispute must deal with its insured “fairly and in good faith.” Ki Sin Kim v.
Allstate Ins. Co., Inc., 223 P.3d 1180, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); see also Wash.
Rev. Code § 48.01.030. However, the insurer need not elevate the insured’s needs
above its own and does not breach its duty if there is a reasonable explanation for
its actions. See Keller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 915 P.2d 1140, 1145 (Wash. Ct. App.
1996). State Farm’s denial of Luckett’s UIM claim was not only reasonable, it was
correct. And the declarations Luckett submitted to support his bad faith claim did
not overcome the fact that he was not legally entitled to recover UIM benefits, nor
did they demonstrate an issue of fact regarding State Farm’s claims-handling
procedures. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on
Luckett’s bad faith claim.2
Last, the district court did not err by refusing to certify a question regarding
State Farm’s setoff to the Washington Supreme Court. A federal court may certify
questions of state law to the Washington Supreme Court if the disputed issue is not
“clearly determined” and is “necessary . . . to dispose of [the case].” Wash. Rev.
2
The district court appropriately exercised its discretion to deny Luckett’s
request for additional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
56(d) as it was unlikely that further discovery would have generated a genuine
issue of material fact. See SEC v. Stein, 906 F.3d 823, 833 (9th Cir. 2018).
4
Code § 2.60.020; Amaker v. King County, 540 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008).
Certification is optional, however, and a district court’s refusal to certify a question
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Riordan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 589
F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009). As discussed, the district court’s interpretation of
Washington law—and its refusal to certify the issue to the Washington
courts—was reasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion.3
AFFIRMED.
3
We have also considered whether we should certify a question to the
Washington Supreme Court and have concluded that certification of any state law
question is “[un]necessary . . . to dispose of [this case].” See Wash. Rev. Code
§ 2.60.020.
5