Patricia Meadow v. Goodrich Corporation ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 13 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICIA MEADOW, No. 20-16753
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-03009-JGZ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GOODRICH CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 9, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER, MURGUIA, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
This case arises out of Patricia Meadow’s claims against Goodrich
Corporation for negligence and premises liability under Arizona law, concerning
injuries Meadow sustained while working for a Goodrich contractor. The district
court granted summary judgment to Goodrich, ruling that Goodrich was statutorily
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
immune from liability under Arizona law for Meadow’s injuries. Goodrich then
moved for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, arguing that Meadow’s counsel had
unreasonably and vexatiously pursued this action despite Goodrich’s repeated
arguments that it was statutorily immune from suit under Arizona law. The district
court denied Goodrich’s motion for sanctions, and Goodrich timely appealed. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling on a motion for
sanctions under § 1927. Kaass L. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1292
(9th Cir. 2015). A district court abuses its discretion if its “application of the correct
legal standard was (1) ‘illogical,’ (2) ‘implausible,’ or (3) without ‘support in
inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.’” United States v.
Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Anderson v. City
of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 577 (1985)).
An attorney who “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs,
expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” § 1927.
Sanctions imposed under § 1927 “must be supported by a finding of subjective bad
faith.” Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir.
2015) (citation omitted). “[S]ubjective bad faith . . . is present when an attorney
knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim
2
for the purpose of harassing an opponent.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d
1091, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Goodrich’s motion
for § 1927 sanctions. The district court reviewed the record and found that the merits
of Meadow’s claims called for “a fact specific determination which require[d]
consideration of the totality of the circumstances.” Notably, the district court
disagreed with Goodrich’s assertion of “overwhelming evidence” from the time
Goodrich filed its answer that Meadow’s claims were barred by Arizona law.
Although Meadow did not ultimately prevail on her claims, the court saw nothing in
the record to indicate that Meadow’s counsel “acted in bad faith” in pursuing those
claims to summary judgment. That holding was not “illogical” or “implausible,”
nor “without support in inferences . . . drawn from the facts in the record.” Hinkson,
585 F.3d at 1262 (internal quotation marks omitted). This result is especially true
considering that “[d]istrict courts enjoy much discretion in determining
whether . . . sanctions are appropriate” under § 1927. Trulis v. Barton, 107 F.3d
685, 694 (9th Cir. 1995).1
1
Meadow challenges the district court’s underlying summary judgment order
in her answering brief—which was filed nearly a year after the district court granted
summary judgment to Goodrich. Meadow has not filed a notice of cross-appeal on
this untimely challenge, so we decline to address it. See Lee v. Burlington N. Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 245 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that we generally require a
notice of cross-appeal where, as here, a party “seeks to increase its monetary
recovery or decrease its monetary liability . . . [or] if an issue affects a legal right
3
AFFIRMED.
that may have an impact on damage recovery.”); see also id. (considering “whether
the nature of the district court opinion should have put the appellee on notice of the
need to file a cross-appeal” (citation omitted)).
4